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ABSTRACT 
Article III of the Constitution provides that the “judicial Power” of 
the United States extends to all cases “arising under” the Constitution, 
laws, and treaties of the United States. What the phrase “arising 
under” imports in Article III has long confounded courts and 
scholars. This Article examines the historical origins of Article III 
“arising under” jurisdiction. First, it describes English legal principles 
that governed the jurisdiction of courts of general and limited 
jurisdiction—principles that animated early American jurisprudence 
regarding the scope of “arising under” jurisdiction. Second, it 
explains how participants in the framing and ratification of the 
Constitution understood “arising under” jurisdiction to provide a 
limited means for ensuring the supremacy of federal law. Third, it 
explains how early American courts, invoking English jurisdictional 
principles, determined Article III “arising under” jurisdiction. In 
particular, this Article explains, in proper historical context, early 
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Marshall Court opinions addressing the scope of Article III “arising 
under” jurisdiction, including the landmark 1824 case Osborn v. 
United States. Contrary to conventional characterizations of these 
opinions, the Marshall Court did not deem any case that might 
involve a federal question to be one “arising under” federal law. 
Rather, against the background of English jurisdictional principles, 
the Marshall Court explicated the Arising Under Clause to mean that 
a federal court could hear cases in which a federal law was 
determinative of a right or title asserted in the proceeding before it. By 
observing jurisdictional rules derived from English law, federal courts 
embraced a practice that enabled them to enforce the supremacy of 
federal law, but checked the extent to which they would encroach 
upon the jurisdiction of state courts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Article III of the Constitution provides that the “judicial Power” 
of the United States extends to all cases “arising under” the 
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.1 Courts have 
long regarded Article III not as providing the judicial power that each 
federal court must have, but rather as specifying a limit on the 
jurisdiction that Congress may give. Since 1875, Congress has given 
federal courts original jurisdiction of cases “arising under” federal 
law.2 Courts have long interpreted the federal statute conferring 
“arising under” jurisdiction upon federal district courts to require that 
a federal question be part of the plaintiff’s “well-pleaded complaint,” 
not a question anticipated or raised as a defense.3 In several cases, the 
Supreme Court has attempted to explain the nature of a federal 
question that must be part of the well-pleaded complaint for a federal 
district court to have statutory “arising under” jurisdiction.4 The 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added). 
 2. In 1875, Congress gave federal circuit courts jurisdiction of “all suits of a civil nature, at 
common law or in equity . . . arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or 
treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority,” subject to an amount-in-
controversy requirement of five hundred dollars. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. 
Following reenactments and reformulations of the 1875 act, federal district courts “have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, law, or treaties of the United 
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). 
 3. Specifically, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that “a suit arises under 
the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff’s statement of his own 
cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution.” Louisville & 
Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). 
 4. In Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921), the Court held that a 
federal district court could exercise federal question jurisdiction if it “appears from the 
[complaint] that the right to relief depends upon the construction or application of [federal 
law].” Id. at 199. In Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986), the Court held 
that a district court could not exercise federal question jurisdiction even though the plaintiff’s 
claim rested upon a provision of federal law that a state law had incorporated on the ground 
that Congress had not provided a private federal right of action for a violation of the federal 
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Court has provided less clarification of what it means for a case to 
“arise under” federal law for purposes of Article III. The Court has 
explained that “arising under” in Article III encompasses more cases 
than “arising under” in the congressional grant of jurisdiction.5 It has 
declined, however, in several cases, to provide any more fulsome 
explanation of Article III “arising under” jurisdiction than that. The 
scope of Article III “arising under” jurisdiction has long confounded 
judges and scholars alike. 
In 1824, in Osborn v. United States,6 the Supreme Court held in 
an opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall that a case arises under 
federal law for purposes of Article III if federal law “forms an 
ingredient of the original cause.”7 Some judges and scholars have read 
Osborn to mean that “Congress may confer on the federal courts 
jurisdiction over any case or controversy that might call for the 
application of federal law.”8 Others have questioned this reading, 
 
provision. Id. at 802–12. In Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 
2363 (2005), the Court attempted to reconcile this line of decisions interpreting the federal 
question jurisdiction statute by holding that a federal court may exercise federal question 
jurisdiction over a civil action that “necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed 
and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally 
approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” Id. at 2368. 
 5. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 807 (“Although the constitutional meaning of ‘arising 
under’ may extend to all cases in which a federal question is ‘an ingredient’ of the action, we 
have long construed the statutory grant of federal-question jurisdiction as conferring a more 
limited power.” (citation omitted)); Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 494 
(1983) (“Although the language of § 1331 parallels that of the ‘Arising Under’ Clause of Art. 
III, this Court never has held that statutory ‘arising under’ jurisdiction is identical to Article III 
‘arising under’ jurisdiction. Quite the contrary is true.”); Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating 
Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 n.51 (1959) (“Of course the many limitations which have been placed on 
jurisdiction under § 1331 are not limitations on the constitutional power of Congress to confer 
jurisdiction on the federal courts.”); see also Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2371 n.* (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“This Court has long construed the scope of the statutory grant of federal-question 
jurisdiction more narrowly than the scope of the constitutional grant of such jurisdiction. I 
assume for present purposes that this distinction is proper . . . .” (citing Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 
807–08)). 
 6. Osborn v. United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
 7. Id. at 823. 
 8. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 492 (emphasis added). Several scholars have characterized 
Osborn as standing for this proposition. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: 
TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 56 (1980) (arguing that Marshall “created 
a classic tail-wagging-the-dog situation; the mere possibility of a federal issue is sufficient to 
authorize Congress to bring a case into federal court under the ‘arising under’ clause”); James 
H. Chadbourn & A. Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 
639, 662 (1942) (characterizing Osborn as holding that any federal issue that “might be raised” is 
“part of the cause”); William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise 
“Directly” Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 891 (1967) (characterizing Osborn as 
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arguing that it has no meaningful limits,9 or that it simply 
miscomprehends Osborn.10 
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court expressly refrained on two 
occasions from defining the breadth of Article III “arising under” 
jurisdiction. In 1983, in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,11 
the Court had to resolve whether actions against foreign states are 
cases “arising under” federal law for purposes of Article III. Rather 
than “decide the precise boundaries of Article III jurisdiction,”12 the 
Court resolved that such actions arise under federal law because a 
court necessarily must determine in each one the federal question of 
whether the foreign state has immunity.13 Six years later, in Mesa v. 
California,14 the Court confronted the question of whether Congress 
may give federal courts removal jurisdiction over claims brought 
against federal officers for actions taken within the course of 
performance of official duties as cases “arising under” federal law for 
Article III purposes.15 Noting the “grave constitutional problems” and 
“serious constitutional doubt” surrounding the meaning of Article III 
“arising under” jurisdiction,16 the Court interpreted the federal officer 
removal statute to authorize removal only when a defendant federal 
officer raises an actual federal defense.17 By invoking the canon of 
 
extending Article III “arising under” jurisdiction to “all cases where issues of federal law might 
possibly be an issue”). 
 9. Some have observed that, taken at its broadest, Osborn might be read as permitting 
“assertion of original federal jurisdiction on the remote possibility of presentation of a federal 
question.” Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 482 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting); see also Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 647 F.2d 320, 328–29 (2d Cir. 1981), 
rev’d, 461 U.S. 480 (1983) (arguing that Osborn should be limited to its facts because there 
should be meaningful limits on Article III jurisdiction). 
 10. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 
800–12 (2004). Paul Mishkin has characterized Osborn as finding “arising under” jurisdiction 
because “matters of federal law had to be decided explicitly or taken for granted in order for a 
decision to be made,” Paul Mishkin, The Federal Question in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. 
REV. 157, 161 (1953), a reading less expansive than the “federal-question-might-be-raised” 
reading. This characterization of Osborn more aptly captures the meaning of Osborn in 
historical context, as this Article explains, than the more expansive reading does. 
 11. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480 (1983). 
 12. Id. at 492. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121 (1989). 
 15. Id. at 137. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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constitutional avoidance,18 the Court refrained from attempting to 
define the scope of Article III “arising under” jurisdiction. 
Neither courts nor scholars have comprehensively examined the 
origins of Article III “arising under” jurisdiction.19 This Article 
undertakes such an examination. The Supreme Court has been 
mindful of historical understandings in determining the scope of 
Article III judicial power.20 Accordingly, the analysis that this Article 
presents is of both historical interest and doctrinal relevance. Even if 
one does not deem historical practice to be determinative of or 
relevant to the meaning courts should ascribe to Article III “arising 
under” jurisdiction, historical practice holds insights into what 
functions such jurisdiction may effectively serve. 
This Article argues that early federal courts, invoking principles 
of English law, limited their function under the Arising Under Clause 
to enforcing the supremacy of actual federal laws. They did not 
recognize Article III “arising under” jurisdiction over cases that 
implicated federal interests but did not implicate actual federal laws. 
This Article chronologically develops the evidence that bears out this 
conclusion. First, it describes jurisdictional principles of English law 
that provide necessary context for understanding early American 
judicial opinions on the scope of Article III “arising under” 
jurisdiction. Specifically, it describes how under English law, a party 
invoking the jurisdiction of a court of limited jurisdiction had to 
affirmatively demonstrate that the court had jurisdiction over the 
case. Second, it explains that a key purpose of Article III “arising 
under” jurisdiction, evident in its framing and the ratification debates 
that surrounded it, was to enforce the supremacy of federal law. 
Finally, it explains how the Marshall Court came to rely upon English 
jurisdictional principles as a means of limiting Article III “arising 
 
 18. See id. (“We are not inclined to abandon a longstanding reading of the officer removal 
statute that clearly preserves its constitutionality and adopt one which raises serious 
constitutional doubt.”). 
 19. For an analysis of the historical foundations of statutory “arising under” jurisdiction in 
the late nineteenth century, see generally Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal 
Question Removal, 71 IOWA L. REV. 717 (1986). 
 20. E.g., Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 
(2000) (explaining that historical practice “in England and the American colonies . . . is 
particularly relevant to the constitutional standing inquiry”); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 
(1999) (explaining that “as the Constitution’s structure, its history, and the authoritative 
interpretations by this Court make clear, the States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect 
of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and 
which they retain today”). 
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under” jurisdiction to cases implicating the supremacy of actual 
federal laws. Contrary to conventional characterizations of its 
opinions, the Marshall Court did not deem any case that might 
involve a federal question one “arising under” federal law. Rather, 
the Supreme Court explicated the Arising Under Clause in the first 
few decades following ratification to mean that a federal court may 
exercise jurisdiction over cases in which an actual federal law was 
determinative of a right or title asserted in the proceeding before it. 
Part I explains principles governing the jurisdiction of English 
courts that early Article III courts came to invoke to determine their 
own jurisdiction. English law distinguished courts of general 
jurisdiction from courts of limited jurisdiction. To bring an action in 
the original jurisdiction of an English court of limited jurisdiction, the 
plaintiff affirmatively had to plead, as part of the right or title 
asserted, facts sufficient to show that the court had jurisdiction. 
English courts of general jurisdiction, however, presumed themselves 
to have jurisdiction unless the defendant specifically proved 
otherwise. The distinction between courts of general and limited 
jurisdiction subsisted in the structures of colonial judicial systems. 
When Article III courts came to describe themselves as courts of 
limited jurisdiction, they imported English jurisdictional practice into 
their own practices. So imported, this was not English practice that 
the Court deemed inconsistent with the principles of the American 
Revolution and the Constitution. As John Jay expressed it in 1793, 
“The English practice . . . [is] more necessary to be observed here 
than there” in light of the federal structure that the Constitution 
established.21 
Part II explains the place of “arising under” jurisdiction in the 
framing and ratification of the Constitution. The proceedings of the 
Federal Convention demonstrate that the delegates settled on 
“arising under” jurisdiction as a limited mechanism—more limited 
than a congressional negative on state laws—to ensure the supremacy 
of federal law. In ratification debates, participants attributed certain 
meanings to “arising under” jurisdiction and offered various reasons 
to justify it. In general, they explained “arising under” jurisdiction as 
a means of enabling federal courts to enforce and settle the meaning 
of federal law. 
 
 21. Shedden v. Custis, 21 F. Cas. 1218, 1219 (C.C.D. Va. 1793) (No. 12,736). 
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Part III proceeds to explain how, post-ratification, federal courts 
came to describe the operation of Article III “arising under” 
jurisdiction. By invoking English jurisdictional principles, federal 
courts effectuated the Founding period vision of “arising under” 
jurisdiction as a limited means of ensuring the supremacy of federal 
law. Early federal courts explained that because they were courts of 
limited rather than general jurisdiction in the sense of English law, 
they could not take original jurisdiction of Article III cases or 
controversies unless the party invoking the court’s jurisdiction 
asserted facts sufficient to demonstrate the court had jurisdiction. For 
“arising under” jurisdiction, this meant that a party invoking federal 
court jurisdiction had to aver that a federal law was determinative of 
a right or title asserted. The Supreme Court applied this principle not 
only to plaintiffs in original actions but also to plaintiffs in error in 
appellate actions seeking review of state court judgments. 
By 1824, when it decided Osborn v. United States, the Marshall 
Court had resolved that a federal court had Article III “arising 
under” jurisdiction if the party seeking federal court jurisdiction 
properly demonstrated that federal law was determinative of a right 
or title asserted in that proceeding. This applied both to the original 
jurisdiction of federal courts and the appellate jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court to review state court judgments. When, over a 
century later, the Supreme Court and scholars came to characterize 
the Marshall Court as reasoning that a federal court constitutionally 
may hear any case that might involve a federal law question, they 
misconstrued the effect that, in historical context, the Marshall Court 
gave to Article III “arising under” jurisdiction. By employing English 
jurisdictional principles, the Marshall Court limited federal courts to 
enforcing the supremacy of actual federal laws. The Marshall Court 
did not assume for federal courts a constitutional jurisdiction to 
vindicate federal interests divorced from the governing requirements 
of an identifiable federal law. 
I.  JURISDICTIONAL PRINCIPLES IN ENGLISH PRACTICE 
This Part describes certain principles by which English courts 
determined their jurisdiction in the decades leading up to the 
establishment of the American Constitution. 
It is worth noting at the outset that the phrase “arising under” 
was not a term of art that the Constitution’s framers borrowed from 
English law. Indeed, it does not appear from surviving reports of pre-
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Founding English judicial action that English courts (or those 
reporting their proceedings) used the phrase. That said, English 
courts did use other phrases containing the word “arising.” English 
courts commonly described actions as “arising within” the territorial 
jurisdiction of a particular court,22 as did state courts in America.23 In 
such instances, courts meant that the factual cause of a particular 
action occurred within the territory of the court’s jurisdiction. Less 
commonly, they described cases as “arising upon” or “arising from” a 
source of law. In such instances, they meant that a particular source of 
law generated the right or remedy the plaintiff was asserting in the 
case.24 English courts occasionally described legal questions as 
“arising out of” or “arising upon” legal instruments that they had to 
 
 22. As Bacon’s Abridgement explains, “Inferior Courts are bounded, in their original 
Creation, to Causes arising within such limited jurisdiction.” 1 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW 
ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 562 (6th ed., Dublin, Luke White 1793) (1736) (emphasis added). 
See generally infra notes 31–34 and accompanying text for examples of cases invoking this 
“arising within” principle. 
Similarly, courts described the jurisdiction of courts of admiralty as over causes of action 
“arising upon” the sea. In Beak v. Thyrwhit, (1688) 87 Eng. Rep. 124 (K.B.), the King’s Bench 
held that “the original cause arising upon the sea, shall and must be tried in the Admiralty.” Id. 
at 124 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Supreme Court of Virginia explained that the 
jurisdiction of the admiralty courts is “confined to cases arising upon the high seas.” Thorton v. 
Smith, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 81, 84 (1792) (emphasis added). 
 23. In 1796, for instance, the Superior Court of Connecticut explained that “[t]he several 
state courts originally had jurisdiction of all causes of every description arising within their 
respective territorial limits.” Miller v. Lynde, 2 Root 444, 445 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1796) (emphasis 
added). Cases that did not “arise within” the jurisdiction of a court “arose out” of its 
jurisdiction. See People v. Justices of the Del. Common Pleas, 1 Johns. Cas. 181, 183 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1799) (per curiam) (“The . . . courts of common pleas . . . were originally constituted by the 
style and title of inferior courts, and were in all respects considered as such. The amount of their 
jurisdiction was limited to 20l. In local extent, their jurisdiction was limited, as they could try no 
action arising out of the county.” (last emphasis added)); Cornwell v. Hosmer, 1 Root 282, 283 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1791) (“[T]he cause of action . . . must have arisen out of the city . . . and so 
the court had not jurisdiction.” (emphasis added)). 
 24. For example, in Hyde v. Cogan, (1781) 99 Eng. Rep. 445 (K.B.), the plaintiff brought an 
action “on” a statute providing damages for certain riotous behavior. Id. at 445. In his opinion in 
the case, Justice Francis Buller expressed that “the clause upon which the case arises is 
remedial.” Id. at 450 (emphasis added). In Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.), the 
King’s Bench used “arising from” language to explain that when Parliament enacts a penal 
statute that prescribes a remedy for a party aggrieved, the party aggrieved may pursue that 
statutory remedy but no other: “Upon such an Act, if the offence, and consequently the right 
which arises from the prohibition, be new, no remedy or mode of prosecution can be pursued, 
except what is directed by the Act.” Id. at 212 (emphasis added). 
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interpret,25 as did state courts in America.26 To resolve a question 
“arising out of” or “upon” a legal instrument, the court had to settle 
the legal instrument’s meaning relative to the disputed question. 
Certain of these “arising” formulations appeared in draft plans of the 
Federal Convention and debates over ratification. Suffice it to say for 
now that in using the phrase “arising under” to describe the federal 
judicial power, the Framers did not invoke a term of art with any 
well-settled and generally accepted meaning. 
Though the Framers do not appear to have borrowed the phrase 
“arising under” from English law, early federal courts borrowed 
general jurisdictional principles of English law to determine Article 
III jurisdiction, including “arising under” jurisdiction. Accordingly, 
the principles by which English courts determined their jurisdiction 
provide useful context for understanding how public officials in 
America came to understand the operation of “arising under” 
jurisdiction during the first decades following ratification. This 
 
 25. See Robinson v. Knight, (1761) 28 Eng. Rep. 856, 857 (Ch.) (“The question in this cause 
arises out of the will . . . and is, whether, upon the true construction of it, a sum of about £21,000 
belongs to the plaintiff or defendant.” (emphasis added)); Villiers v. Villiers, (1740) 27 Eng. 
Rep. 657, 658 (Ch.) (“There are other Questions in the present Cause arising upon the 
Deeds . . . .” (emphasis added)); Westerdell v. Dale, (1797) 101 Eng. Rep. 989, 992 (K.B.) 
(Kenyon, C.J.) (describing how questions “have arisen on the construction of this Act of 
Parliament” (emphasis added)); Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 206 (explaining that a question of 
copyright infringement could “arise upon the term granted by the Act of Parliament” (emphasis 
added)); Pierce v. Hopper, (1720) 93 Eng. Rep. 503, 504 (K.B.) (argument of counsel) (“The 
main question in this case will arise upon the first clause in the Act of Parliament . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
 26. See Simpson v. Nadiau, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 39, 41 (Super. Ct. 1798) (Haywood, J.) 
(stating that “a question . . . ought to be decided by some court . . . whose peculiar business is to 
decide questions arising upon the law of nations” (emphasis added)); Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. 
(1 Va. Cas.) 20, 93 (Va. 1793) (Tucker, J.) (“It will not, I presume, be denied that the decisions 
of the supreme court of appeals in this commonwealth, upon any question, whether arising upon 
the general principles of law, the operation or construction of any statute or act of assembly, or 
of the constitution of the commonwealth, are to be resorted to by all other courts, as 
expounding, in their truest sense, the laws of the land.” (emphasis added)); see also Dulany v. 
Wells, 3 H. & McH. 20, 42 (Md. 1790) (argument of counsel) (prefacing argument with the 
phrase “if any doubt or obscurity arises upon the expressions in this article” (emphasis added)); 
Roy v. Garnett, 2 Va. (2 Wash.) 9, 35 (1794) (explaining that “a question arises upon the act of 
1776” (emphasis added)); Stott v. Alexander & Co., 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 331, 331 (1794) (argument 
of counsel) (stating that “[t]here is but a single question in this cause, which arises upon the 
construction of the Act of Assembly” (emphasis added)); cf. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 
Wheat.) 1, 21 (1825) (“But the questions do not arise on the judgment, or the execution; and, so 
far as they depend on the return, enough of that is stated, to show the Court, that the Marshal 
has proceeded according to the late laws of Kentucky.” (emphasis added)). 
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Section describes those principles as they related to both original and 
appellate jurisdiction. 
A. Principles of Original Jurisdiction 
This Section describes, first, the distinction that subsisted in 
English law between courts of general jurisdiction and courts of 
limited jurisdiction. It explains how the common law and acts of 
Parliament limited English courts’ jurisdiction in various ways, 
including by the territory in which an action arose, the subject matter 
to which an action related, the status of parties to an action, and the 
source of law governing an action. In various ways, these 
jurisdictional limitations operated in colonial legal systems as well. 
Next, this Section describes the different rules by which courts of 
general and limited jurisdiction determined their respective 
jurisdictions. Courts of general jurisdiction presumed themselves to 
have jurisdiction over a case unless the defendant proved otherwise. 
Courts of limited jurisdiction, in contrast, presumed themselves to 
lack jurisdiction unless the party invoking the court’s jurisdiction 
proved otherwise. The purpose of this Section is to describe specific 
English jurisdictional doctrines that federal courts would come to 
invoke to effectuate the jurisdictional grants of Article III. 
1. Courts of General and Limited Jurisdiction. 
a. In England.  The jurisdiction of the courts of England was, as 
Bacon’s Abridgement explains, “bounded and circumscribed by 
certain Laws and stated Rules,” by which courts had to abide “in all 
their Proceedings and Judicial Determinations.”27 These laws and 
rules distinguished courts of “general” jurisdiction from courts of 
“limited” jurisdiction. 
The superior courts of England—most notably, the courts of 
King’s Bench, Chancery, Common Pleas, and Exchequer—held 
themselves to have a general jurisdiction. Certain other courts, such 
as the Counties Palatine, Courts of Great Sessions in Wales, and 
Court of Ely, also exercised a general jurisdiction. Courts of general 
jurisdiction exercised a “universal” jurisdiction over the rights or 
titles that persons subject to the jurisdiction of the court might assert. 
There were only limited exceptions to the jurisdiction of courts of 
 
 27. 1 BACON, supra note 22, at 558. 
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general jurisdiction. A case might “especially appear” to be outside of 
the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction28 if the case was local 
to the courts of another nation29 or if Parliament provided that a 
particular court should have exclusive jurisdiction over the case.30 
In contrast to courts of general jurisdiction, courts of limited 
jurisdiction did not exercise a “universal” jurisdiction. The common 
law and acts of Parliament defined or limited the jurisdiction of 
inferior courts in various ways. Specifically, they limited jurisdiction 
according to (1) the territory in which an action arose, (2) the subject 
matter to which an action related, (3) the character of a party or the 
parties to an action, (4) the nature of an action being brought, or (5) 
the source of law governing an action. 
First, English law limited the territorial jurisdiction of inferior 
courts: they could hear only actions “arising within” their territorial 
jurisdiction. For an inferior court to have jurisdiction, “the Cause of 
the Action” or “the Gist of the Action” had to “arise within” the 
territory of the inferior court.31 In other words, English courts 
understood that there were facts that constituted “the” cause of the 
action, and that the cause had to “arise within” the inferior court’s 
jurisdiction. In 1795, in King v. Danser,32 Lord Kenyon explained that 
“[g]enerally speaking, nothing is clearer than that it is necessary, in 
inferior jurisdictions, that the cause of action must be laid and proved 
to arise within the jurisdiction.”33 Case by case, courts determined 
whether the factual causes of particular actions arose within the 
jurisdiction of inferior courts.34 
 
 28. See id. at 559 (explaining that “every Thing is supposed to be done within their 
Jurisdiction, unless the contrary especially appears”). 
 29. See Jennings v. Hankyn, 90 (1687) Eng. Rep. 612, 612 (K.B.) (setting forth, as an 
example, that the court would not have jurisdiction over a case to recover on a bond “made at 
Bourdeaux in France, for in such case this Court never had any jurisdiction, because the matter 
did arise in a foreign nation”). 
 30. See, e.g., 1 BACON, supra note 22, at 560 (explaining that by charter and act of 
Parliament, the universities of Oxford and Cambridge each had jurisdiction over actions 
between their respective scholars); EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 171–74 (London, 1797) (1644) [hereinafter COKE, THE FOURTH PART 
OF THE INSTITUTES] (reciting act of Parliament, 21 Jac. reg. ca. 4, providing that only particular 
courts could exercise jurisdiction over informers’ actions on penal statutes). 
 31. 1 BACON, supra note 22, at 564 (emphasis added). 
 32. King v. Danser, (1795) 101 Eng. Rep. 533 (K.B.). 
 33. Id. at 534 (emphasis added). Similarly, the courts of Admiralty had jurisdiction over 
actions “arising upon” the seas. See supra note 22. 
 34. See, e.g., Heaven v. Davenport, (1721) 88 Eng. Rep. 1092, 1092 (K.B.) (holding that an 
inferior court lacked jurisdiction over an action in assumpsit for “money laid out” because, 
01__BELLIA.DOC 12/6/2007  8:42:34 AM 
2007] “ARISING UNDER” JURISDICTION 275 
Second, the common law and certain acts of Parliament limited 
the jurisdiction of inferior courts by the subject matter to which the 
action related. For example, the courts of the Stanneries had a limited 
jurisdiction over, inter alia, actions concerning or depending upon the 
stanneries.35 Similarly, by act of Parliament, the Court of Constable 
and Earl Marshal could take cognizance “of Contracts touching 
Deeds of Arms, and of War out of the Realm.”36 Such regulations 
defined jurisdiction according to the relationship that subsisted 
between the action and a subject matter, be it a place, thing, or event. 
Third, English law limited the jurisdiction of certain courts by the 
character of the parties. For example, in addition to having 
jurisdiction over actions relating to the stanneries, the courts of the 
Stanneries had jurisdiction over actions between tinners.37 Likewise, 
the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, by their charters and acts 
of Parliament, had jurisdiction over actions between their respective 
scholars.38 
Fourth, acts of Parliament limited the jurisdiction of certain 
inferior English courts according to the form of action being brought. 
In other words, rather than define jurisdiction according to a factual 
subject matter to which an action related, they defined it according to 
the legal form by which a plaintiff would have to bring an action. For 
example, a plaintiff had to bring an informer action based upon an 
offense “committed against any penal statute” in particular inferior 
courts having jurisdiction over the place “wherein such offences shall 
 
though the plaintiff alleged the promise “to be in the jurisdiction of the Court,” the plaintiff 
failed to allege that “the money was laid out in the jurisdiction,” and “the money laid out is the 
cause of action” (emphasis added)); Hanslap v. Cater, (1684) 86 Eng. Rep. 163, 163 (K.B.) 
(holding that the Court of Coventry lacked jurisdiction over an action in assumpsit when, 
though the debt and the promise for goods sold were within the court’s jurisdiction, “the goods 
were not alledged to be sold within the jurisdiction of the Court”); Drake v. Beare, (1674) 83 
Eng. Rep. 319, 319 (K.B.) (holding that the Court at Exeter lacked jurisdiction over an action of 
debt on a lease when it did “not appear that the lands lay within the jurisdiction of the Court” 
because “if part of the cause of action lies within the jurisdiction of the Court, and part without, 
the Inferior Court ought not to hold plea”); Ramsy v. Atkinson, (1672) 83 Eng. Rep. 292, 292 
(K.B.) (holding that the Palace-Court lacked jurisdiction over an action in assumpsit because, 
though the “promise” was made within the Palace-Court’s jurisdiction, the “consideration” was 
not). 
 35. COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES, supra note 30, at 231. 
 36. 1 BACON, supra note 22, at 602; see also COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE 
INSTITUTES, supra note 30, at 122 (stating that the “lord constable” and “earl marshall” have 
jurisdiction “of contracts and deeds of arms, and of war out of the realm”). 
 37. COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES, supra note 30, at 231. 
 38. 1 BACON, supra note 22, at 560. 
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be committed.”39 A purpose of vesting jurisdiction of such actions in 
“local” courts was to prevent informers from forcing the “poor 
commons” to have to answer such actions in the potentially distant 
courts of Westminster.40 
Finally, English law limited the jurisdiction of certain courts 
according to the source of the governing law. For example, the act of 
Parliament giving the Court of the Constable and Earl Marshal 
cognizance of actions “which touch War within the Realm,” further 
provided that the court could only hear such an action if it could 
“[]not be determined nor discussed by the Common Law.”41 The 
reason for this limitation was to prevent the Court of the Constable 
and Earl Marshal from encroaching the jurisdiction of law courts. As 
the preamble to the act and Coke’s Institutes explain, Parliament 
enacted the regulation because “the court of the constable and 
marshall . . . daily doe encroach contracts, covenants, trespasses, debts 
and detinues, and many other actions pleadable at common law, in 
great prejudice of the king and of his courts, and to the great 
grievance and oppression of his people.”42 
b. In the Colonies.  The same distinction between courts of 
general and limited jurisdiction that subsisted in England operated in 
colonial legal systems. The origins and histories of many colonial 
courts are nebulous.43 Judicial structures emerged from different 
sources of authority—including royal charters, commissions, and 
instructions; as well as acts of colonial assemblies—acting in concert 
 
 39. See COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES, supra note 30, at 172. Informer 
actions referred to those actions created by statute pursuant to which an “informer” could 
recover a statutory penalty for suing for a particular legal violation. As Blackstone described it, 
“these forfeitures created by statute are given at large to any common informer; or, in other 
words, to any such person or persons as will sue for the same: and hence such actions are called 
popular actions, because they are given to the people in general.” WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 
COMMENTARIES *160. 
 40. COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES, supra note 30, at 172. 
 41. 1 BACON, supra note 22, at 602; see also COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE 
INSTITUTES, supra note 30, at 122 (stating that the statute giving the “constable” and “marshall” 
jurisdiction over actions “that touch war within the realm,” further provided that the court 
could only hear such an action if it could “[]not be determined or discussed by the common 
law”). 
 42. COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES, supra note 30, at 123. 
 43. Erwin C. Surrency, The Courts in the American Colonies, 11 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 253, 
257 (1967) (“The precise origins of many courts in America are difficult to determine because of 
their nebulous beginnings.”). 
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or opposition.44 It is not necessary for purposes of this Article to 
recount all that is known of this history; it suffices to explain that 
during the late colonial period the distinction between courts of 
general and limited jurisdiction was operative in various ways in 
colonial legal systems. 
From early in their histories, colonial authorities established (or 
attempted to establish) courts of general jurisdiction. There are 
instances, especially in the seventeenth century, of colonial 
authorities using simple and broad language to establish general 
courts. For instance, in 1645, colonial authorities in Virginia enacted 
that “all causes of what value soever between party and party shall be 
tried in the countie courts by verdict of a jurie if either party shall 
desire it.”45 Similarly, in 1683, colonial authorities in New York 
enacted that 
there shall be held and kept within Every County of the said 
province Courts of sessions yearly and Every yeare for the hearing 
tryeing and determining of all Causes and Cases there brought and 
Comenced, As well Cases and Causes Criminall, as Cases and 
Causes civill betweene party and party.46 
As colonial legal systems developed, colonial assemblies enacted 
more specific jurisdictional regulations, in some instances establishing 
general jurisdictions meant to be coextensive with the general 
jurisdictions of English courts. In 1722, the General Assembly of 
Pennsylvania enacted that the judges of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania 
generally shall minister justice to all persons, and exercise the 
jurisdictions and powers hereby granted concerning all and singular 
the premises according to law, as fully and amply, to all intents and 
purposes whatsoever, as the Justices of the Court of King’s Bench, 
 
 44. There were instances, especially in the second half of the eighteenth century, of royal 
authority denying jurisdiction that colonial assemblies had conferred, with or without 
subsequent defiance by the assembly through reenacting the regulation. Cf. THE DECLARATION 
OF INDEPENDENCE para. 10 (U.S. 1776) (“He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by 
refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers.”). 
 45. Act 10 (Nov. 20, 1645), in 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL 
THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 303, 303 (William Waller Hening ed., New York, R. & W. & G. Bartow 
1823) (emphasis added). 
 46. An Act to Settle Courts of Justice (Nov. 1, 1683), in 1 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW 
YORK FROM THE YEAR 1664 TO THE REVOLUTION 125, 125 [hereinafter NEW YORK 
COLONIAL LAWS] (James B. Lyon, Albany, State Printer 1894) (emphasis added). 
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Common Pleas, and Exchequer, at Westminster, or any of them, 
may or can do.47 
In several instances, colonial assemblies established courts of general 
jurisdiction for their colonies.48 
Colonial assemblies also limited the jurisdiction of certain 
colonial courts in the same ways that English custom or acts of 
Parliament limited the jurisdiction of English courts: by the territory 
in which the action arose, the subject matter to which the action 
related, the character of the parties, the kind of action brought, and, 
in limited instances, the source of law governing the action. In 
addition, acts of several colonial assemblies limited the jurisdiction of 
courts by imposing “amount-in-controversy” requirements. 
First, several colonial assemblies enacted laws specifying the 
limited territorial jurisdiction of certain courts. In some instances, 
they provided that provincial courts would have jurisdiction over 
actions “arising within” the jurisdiction of the colony. In 1737, the 
South Carolina assembly enacted that its Court of Common Pleas 
could adjudicate “all common pleas happening and arising within the 
jurisdiction” of that court.49 In other instances, assemblies provided 
 
 47. An Act for Establishing Courts of Judicature in This Province, § 13 (May 22, 1722), in 
A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA 310 (John Purdon ed., Phila., Philip H. Nicklin 
1818). 
 48. See An Act for Establishing Superiour Courts (1711), microformed on Connecticut 
Colonial Session Laws, 1711 May Session, at 167, 167 (William S. Hein & Co.) (establishing a 
superior court of judicature and giving it a general jurisdiction); An Act for the Better 
Regulation of the Supreme Court Within This Government, ch. 167.a, § 3 (1760), in 1 LAWS OF 
THE STATE OF DELAWARE 374, 375–76 (New-Castle, Samuel & John Adams 1797) (giving the 
supreme court a general jurisdiction); An Act for Establishing Courts of Publick Justice Within 
this Province, ch. 4 (Aug. 17, 1699), in 1 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 660, 663–64 (A.S. 
Batchellor ed., Manchester, John B. Clarke Co. 1904) (establishing a superior court of 
judicature of general jurisdiction); An Act for the More Regular Establishing a Superior Court 
of Judicature, Court of Assize, and General Goal of Delivery, Throughout the Colony (1746), 
microformed on Rhode Island Colonial Session Laws, 1746 June Regular Session, at 27, 27 
(William S. Hein & Co.) (vesting a general jurisdiction in the Superior Court of Judicature, 
Court of Assize, and General Goal Delivery); An Act for the Better Regulating the Court of 
Common Pleas, No. 622 (Mar. 5, 1737), in 7 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
189, 189–91 (David J. McCord ed., Columbia, S.C., A.S. Johnston 1840) (establishing the Court 
of Common Pleas with civil jurisdiction “in as full and ample manner to all intents and purposes 
whatsoever, as the court of common pleas at Westminster and the justices thereof do, can, or 
lawfully may there have, hold, use, exercise and enjoy”). 
 49. An Act for the Better Regulating the Court of Common Pleas, No. 622 (Mar. 5, 1737), 
in 7 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 48, at 189, 189–91. In certain 
instances, colonial assemblies provided that provincial courts should hear cases in the locale in 
which they arose. See, e.g., An Act for Tryal of all Matters of Fact, § 2 (Oct. 1753), in ACTS OF 
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for specialized tribunals having jurisdiction over actions arising within 
the territory of the province.50 Finally, several assemblies provided 
that county or town courts would have jurisdiction over causes of 
action “arising within” the county or town. In 1769, for example, New 
Hampshire’s assembly established the Inferior Court of Common 
Pleas for each county with jurisdiction “in all matters & Causes 
Arising within such Counties.”51 
Second, colonial authorities enacted laws limiting the jurisdiction 
of courts to actions relating to a particular subject matter. A 1762 
North Carolina act gave inferior and superior courts jurisdiction “to 
take cognizance of all matters concerning orphans and their estates.”52 
A 1722 statute for Connecticut enacted that the provincial superior 
court would have special jurisdiction “to Enquire into, Hear, and 
 
THE PROVINCE OF MARYLAND 46, 47 (Annapolis, Jonas Green 1754) (providing that justices of 
Assize Nisi Prius, and justices of Oyer and Terminer, and Gaol Delivery may hear actions 
“where the Facts have arisen, or shall arise”). 
 50. See, e.g., An Act for Holding Special or Extraordinary Courts of Common Pleas, for 
the Trial of Causes Arising Between Merchants, Dealers, and Others, and Ship-masters, 
Supercargoes, and Other Transient Persons, § 1 (1763), in ACTS PASSED BY THE GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY OF GEORGIA 10, 11 (Savannah, James Johnston 1764) (authorizing the appointment 
of a special or extraordinary court upon petition by “any ship-master, supercargoe, or other 
transient person or persons, who shall have any dispute or difference with any merchant, dealer, 
or other person or persons, touching any contract, agreement, sale, promise, debt or demand 
whatsoever, made or arising within this province” when there would be “great inconvenience 
and damage” by having to pursue the matter in the ordinary course of proceeding). 
 51. An Act for Dividing this Province into Counties, and for More Easy Administration of 
Justice (Apr. 29, 1769), in 3 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 524, 526 (Henry Harrison Metcalf ed., 
Bristol, Musgrove Printing House 1915); see also Courts (1702), in ACTS AND LAWS OF HIS 
MAJESTIES COLONY OF CONNECTICUT IN NEW-ENGLAND 22, 24 (Boston, Bartholomew Green 
& John Allen 1702) (giving county courts jurisdiction over “all causes, Civil and also Criminal, 
(not extending to Life, Limb, Banishment or Divorce,) arising or happening within such 
County”); An Act to Settle Courts of Justice (Nov. 1, 1683), in 1 NEW YORK COLONIAL LAWS, 
supra note 46, at 125, 125–26 (providing that “there shall be held and kept within Every County 
of the said province Courts of sessions yearly and Every yeare for the hearing tryeing and 
determining of all Causes and Cases there brought and Comenced, As well Cases and Causes 
Criminall, as Cases and Causes civill betweene party and party which Cases and Causes shall be 
tryed . . . within the County where the fact shall arise or grow”); An Act for Establishing Ports 
and Towns, ch. 42 (Oct. 1705), in 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL 
THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 404, 410 (William Waller Hening ed., Phila., Thomas DeSilver 1823) 
(providing “[t]hat all causes of greater value than thirty pounds sterling, ariseing within the 
precincts or jurisdiction of any burgh, may be tryed, heard and determined by the respective 
county courts, wherein the said burghs ly”). Such limitations operated to preclude a court from 
exercising jurisdiction over “transitory” actions. 
 52. An Act for the Better Care of Orphans, and Security and Management of Their 
Estates, ch. 5, § 5 (Nov. 3, 1762), in 1 THE PUBLIC ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 
NORTH CAROLINA 141–42 (James Iredell ed., Francois-Xavier Martin ed., rev. ed. 1804). 
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Determine all Crimes Committed” in Hartford riots.53 Similarly, a 
1764 Connecticut act provided “[t]hat the Superior Court only, shall 
have Cognizance of all Pleas that relate to the Crime of Adultery.”54 
Third, colonial authorities enacted certain laws limiting the 
jurisdiction of courts according to the character of the parties. New 
York and Virginia statutes limited the jurisdiction of certain courts to 
disputes of a certain value, unless the suit involved particular 
government officials.55 In effect, these statutes provided jurisdiction if 
the plaintiff claimed a certain amount or the action was brought by or 
against the governmental officials specified. In 1741, North Carolina 
authorities enacted a statute giving justices of peace jurisdiction to 
hear complaints of persons who were free but who were being kept or 
sold as slaves.56 
Fourth, many colonial enactments limited the jurisdiction of 
particular courts according to the form of action a plaintiff was 
bringing. Colonial authorities gave local courts, such as justices of the 
 
 53. An Act for Appointing the Judges of the Superior Court to Enquire into, Hear, and 
Determine all Crimes Committed in a Late Riot at Hartford (Oct. 1722), microformed on 
Connecticut Colonial Session Laws, supra note 48, 1722 Oct. Session, at 274, 274. Similarly, in 
1768, a statute for Rhode Island empowered the justices of the Superior Court of Judicature, 
Court of Assize and General Gaol Delivery “to hold a Special Court . . . to hear, try, and 
determine any Person or Persons concerned in the Affray that happened in the Town of 
Newport.” An Act Empowering the Justices of the Superior Court of Judicature, Court of 
Assize and General Gaol Delivery, to Meet and Hold a Special Court, for the Trial of Thomas 
Carfels, Charles John Marshall, and Robert Young (May 1768), microformed on Rhode Island 
Colonial Session Laws, supra note 48, 1768 May Regular Session, at 10, 10. 
 54. An Act for Restraining Tryals, in Cases of Adultery, to the Superior Court (Oct. 1764), 
microformed on Connecticut Colonial Session Laws, supra note 48, 1764 Oct. Session, at 315. 
 55. See An Act for Preventing Suits Being Brought in the Supreme Court of This Colony 
for Any Sums Not Exceeding Fifty Pounds (May 20, 1769), in 4 NEW YORK COLONIAL LAWS, 
supra note 46, at 1088, 1089–90 (providing that the amount-in-controversy requirement to bring 
action in the supreme court of the colony did not extend to actions brought by certain officials 
and government entities); An Act for Establishing a General Court, ch. 17, § 3 (Oct. 1777), in 9 
THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 401, 402 
(William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, J. & G. Cochran 1819) (providing that “no person shall 
sue out original process for the trial of any matter or thing in the general court of less value than 
ten pounds, or two thousand pounds of tobacco, except it be against the justices of a county, or 
other inferiour court, or the vestry of a parish, on penalty of being nonsuited, and having his suit 
dismissed with costs”); An Act for Establishing a High Court of Chancery, ch. 15, § 2 (Oct. 
1777), in 9 THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, 
supra, at 389, 390 (providing that “no person shall commence an original suit in the [High Court 
of Chancery] in any matter of less value than ten pounds, except it be against the justice of any 
county or other inferiour court, or the vestry of any parish, on pain of having the same dismissed 
with costs”). 
 56. An Act Concerning Servants and Slaves, ch. 24, § 24 (Apr. 4, 1741), in PUBLIC ACTS OF 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 52, at 57, 61. 
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peace, jurisdiction over actions of debt and other specific actions, 
such as trespass and replevin, often subject to an amount-in-
controversy requirement. In 1772, the New York assembly enacted 
“[t]hat all Actions, Cases and Causes of Debt, Trespass, Trespass 
upon the Case and Replevin” were “cognizable before any one 
Justice of the Peace of any of the Counties, or the Mayor, Recorder 
or Alderman of the Cities of New York and Albany, and Borough of 
Westchester respectively within this Colony.”57 New York authorities 
also excluded actions for defamation and slander from certain local 
courts,58 vesting jurisdiction instead in the supreme court of the 
colony.59 On the criminal side, colonial authorities gave courts 
jurisdiction, or limited courts’ jurisdiction, to hear actions for loss of 
 
 57. An Act to Impower Justices of the Peace Mayors Recorders and Aldermen to Try 
Causes to the Value of Five Pounds and Under and for Suspending an Act Therein Mentioned 
(Mar. 12, 1772), in 5 NEW YORK COLONIAL LAWS, supra note 46, at 304, 304–05; see also An 
Act for the More Easy and Speedy Recovery of Small Debts and Damages, § 1 (Apr. 24, 1760), 
microformed on Georgia Colonial Session Laws, Acts 1755-1761, at 77, 77 (William S. Hein & 
Co.) (giving justices of the peace jurisdiction over “all actions of debt or damage . . . for any sum 
not exceeding the value of eight pounds Sterling”); An Act for Establishing Courts of Publick 
Justice Within This Province, ch. 4 (Aug. 17, 1699), in 1 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 
48, at 662 (granting jurisdiction to justices of the peace for “Actions of Debt and 
Trespass . . . arising or happening within this Province, to the value of Forty Shillings”); Act of 
May 6, 1690, microformed on Rhode Island Colonial Session Laws, supra note 48, Laws & Acts 
1636-1705 1st Settlement (form 2 of 5) (giving assistants or justices of the peace jurisdiction over 
debts and trespasses not exceeding forty shillings); Act 56, in 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; 
BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 45, at 272, 273 (providing 
“that no court of justice within the collony shall proceed to determine or adjudge or at all take 
cognisance of any suite hereafter to be comenced for or concerning any debt under the value of 
20s. sterling or two hundred pounds of tabaccoe, but in such case, the next adjoyning comiss. to 
the creditor to sumon the debtor or deft . . . and to determine the same”). 
 58. An Act to Impower Justices of the Peace, Mayors, Recorders and Aldermen to Try 
Causes to the Value of Ten Pounds and Under and for Suspending an Act (May 20, 1769), in 4 
NEW YORK COLONIAL LAWS, supra note 46, at 1079, 1085 (providing that an act regulating 
jurisdiction of local courts should not be construed to extend to, inter alia, “any Action or 
Actions of Defamation or Slander”). 
 59. An Act for Preventing Suits Being Brought in the Supreme Court of This Colony for 
Any Sums Not Exceeding Fifty Pounds (May 20, 1769), in 4 NEW YORK COLONIAL LAWS, 
supra note 46, at 1088, 1089–90 (providing that the amount-in-controversy requirement to bring 
action in the supreme court of the colony did not extend to actions of assault, battery, or 
slander). 
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life or limb,60 or thieving and stealing,61 or offenses committed by 
slaves.62 
Fifth, in certain instances, colonial authorities limited the 
jurisdiction of colonial courts according to the source of law that 
would govern an action. In 1769, a New York statute enacted that 
all and every the Sum and Sums of Money under the value of ten 
Pounds to be sued for and recovered in any Court of Record by 
virtue of any Law of this Colony shall and hereby are made 
cognizable before any one Justice Mayor Recorder or Aldermen in 
manner as aforesaid any thing in the said Acts mentioned to the 
contrary in any wise notwithstanding.63 
The import of this statute was to give local courts jurisdiction over all 
actions valued under ten pounds even if a prior New York law 
creating the liability excluded local courts from hearing actions on it. 
In doing so, this statute drew a distinction between actions for money 
due by virtue of the laws of New York and actions for money due by 
virtue of another source of law. In 1768, the Rhode Island assembly 
enacted a law giving inferior general courts jurisdiction to discharge 
the debts of “those who have, or that shall, or may have, granted unto 
them the benefit” of the Rhode Island Act of Insolvency and to 
 
 60. See Courts (1702), in ACTS AND LAWS OF HIS MAJESTIES COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 
IN NEW-ENGLAND, supra note 51, at 23–24 (giving Courts of Assistance jurisdiction of all 
“Tryals for Life, Limb, Banishment and Divorce” and giving County Courts jurisdiction over 
“all causes, Civil and also Criminal, (not extending to Life, Limb, Banishment or Divorce,) 
arising or happening within such County”); An Act for Establishing County Courts and for 
Regulating and Settling the Proceedings Therein, ch. 7, § 5 (Oct. 1748), in 5 THE STATUTES AT 
LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 489, 491 (William Waller 
Hening ed., Richmond, W.W. Gray 1819) (excepting from the jurisdiction of county courts 
“such criminal causes where the judgment upon conviction, shall be for the loss of life or 
member, and . . . the prosecution of causes to outlawry against any person or persons”). 
 61. An Act for the Speedy Tryal of Criminals, and Ascertaining Their Punishment, in the 
County-Courts, When Prosecuted There (June 3, 1715), in ACTS OF ASSEMBLY, PASSED IN THE 
PROVINCE OF MARYLAND, FROM 1692, TO 1715, at 136, 136 (London, John Baskett 1723) 
(providing that county courts have jurisdiction over “all Thieving and Stealing of any Goods or 
Chattels whatsoever, not being above the Value of One thousand Pounds of Tobacco”). 
 62. An Act for the Trial of Negroes, ch. 43.a, § 1 (1721), in 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF 
DELAWARE, supra note 48, at 102, 102 (giving justices of the peace jurisdiction over “offences 
committed by any Negro or Mulatto slaves”); An Act for Establishing a Jurisdiction for the 
Trial of Negroes and Other Slaves (Apr. 11, 1768), microformed on Georgia Colonial Session 
Laws, supra note 57, 1767 Oct. Session, at 417, 417 (giving justices of the peace jurisdiction over 
crimes and offenses committed by slaves). 
 63. An Act to Impower Justices of the Peace, Mayors, Recorders and Aldermen to Try 
Causes to the Value of Ten Pounds and Under and for Suspending an Act (May 20, 1769), in 4 
NEW YORK COLONIAL LAWS, supra note 46, at 1079, 1085 (emphasis added). 
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enforce the Act “as fully and amply, to all Intents and Purposes, as 
the Justices of the Superior Court of Judicature, Court of Assize, and 
General Gaol-Delivery, could or might do by Virtue of said Act.”64 
This act, like the New York act, conferred judicial jurisdiction over 
actions according to the source of law that would govern them. 
Finally, numerous colonial enactments defined the jurisdiction of 
courts according to the “amount in controversy” in the action. 
Typically, they gave local courts (such as county courts and justices of 
the peace) jurisdiction when the amount in controversy was below a 
specified sum,65 or, correspondingly, gave general courts jurisdiction 
when the amount in controversy was above a specified sum.66 
 
 64. An Act for Empowering the Justices of the Inferior Court of Common Pleas, to 
Discharge Prisoners and Others, Who Have Had, or Shall Have Extended unto Them the 
Benefit of the Act of Insolvency (June 16, 1768), microformed on Rhode Island Colonial 
Session Laws, supra note 48, 1768 June Adjourned Session, at 28, 29. 
 65. See, e.g., An Act for the More Easy and Speedy Recovery of Small Debts and 
Damages, § 1 (Apr. 24, 1760), microformed on Georgia Colonial Session Laws, supra note 57, 
Acts 1755-1761, at 77, 77 (giving justices of the peace jurisdiction over “all actions of debt or 
damage . . . for any sum not exceeding the value of eight pounds Sterling”); An Act for the 
Advancement of Justice, ch. 23, § 5 (Oct. 1763), in ACTS OF ASSEMBLY, OF THE PROVINCE OF 
MARYLAND (Annapolis, Jonas Green 1763) (providing that county courts may hear actions 
“where the Matter or Thing in Dispute shall not exceed the Sum of Twenty Pounds Sterling 
Money, or Five Thousand Pounds of Tobacco”); An Act for Establishing and Regulating Courts 
of Publick Justice Within This Province, ch. 4 (Aug. 17, 1699), in 1 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, 
supra note 48, at 662, 663 (granting jurisdiction to justices of the peace for civil and criminal 
actions in which the amount claimed is less than forty shillings and to an inferior court of 
common pleas for actions in which the amount claimed is less than twenty pounds); An Act to 
Erect and Establish Courts in the Several Counties of This Colony, for the Tryal of Small 
Causes, ch. 100, § 2 (1748), in THE ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PROVINCE OF 
NEW-JERSEY 388, 388 (Samuel Nevill ed., 1752) (providing that justices of the peace may hear 
actions in which the amount claimed is five pounds or less); An Act to Impower Justices of the 
Peace Mayors Recorders and Aldermen to Try Causes to the Value of Five Pounds and Under 
and for Suspending an Act (Mar. 12, 1772), in 5 NEW YORK COLONIAL LAWS, supra note 46, at 
304, 305; An Act for Better Determining of Debts and Demands Under Forty Shillings, and for 
laying aside the Two Weeks Court in the City of Philadelphia, ch. 211, § 1 (May 28, 1715), in 
LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 108 (photo. Reprint 1979) (M. Carey & J. 
Bioren eds., 1803) (giving justice of the peace jurisdiction of complaints for debts under forty 
shillings); Act of May 6, 1690, microformed on Rhode Island Colonial Session Laws, supra note 
48, Laws & Acts 1636-1705, 1st Settlement (form 2 of 5) (giving assistants or justices of the 
peace jurisdiction over debts and trespasses not exceeding forty shillings); An Act for the Trial 
of Small and Mean Causes; and for Repealing the Several Acts Now in Force Which Relate to 
Recovery of Small Debts, No. 772 (June 13, 1747), in THE PUBLIC LAWS OF THE STATE OF 
SOUTH-CAROLINA 213, 213–14 (J.F. Grimké ed., Phila., R. Aitken & Son 1790) (giving justices 
of the peace jurisdiction of actions in which the demand does not exceed twenty pounds). 
 66. See, e.g., An Act for Establishing Courts of Publick Justice Within This Province, ch. 4 
(Aug. 17, 1699), in 1 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 48, at 663–64 (granting jurisdiction 
to a superior court of judicature for cases in which the amount claimed is greater than twenty 
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The point of this analysis is to demonstrate that the distinction 
that operated in English law between courts of general jurisdiction 
and courts of limited jurisdiction operated in various ways in colonial 
legal systems. At the Federal Convention, each proposed plan of 
government would call for a federal judiciary of limited jurisdiction, 
jurisdiction limited in ways that English and colonial legal regimes 
limited the jurisdiction of certain courts. 
2. The Rules by Which Courts Determined Their Respective 
Jurisdictions.  Given the ways in which English law limited the 
jurisdiction of certain courts, English courts employed rules to give 
them effect. English courts described general principles by which 
courts of general and limited jurisdiction were to determine their 
respective jurisdictions. A court of general jurisdiction was presumed 
to have jurisdiction unless it “especially appear[ed]” that the court 
lacked jurisdiction.67 It could “especially appear” to the court that it 
lacked jurisdiction in different ways. In certain cases, the defendant 
could properly plead that the court lacked jurisdiction. If, for 
example, an action brought in King’s Bench arose with a county 
Palatine, the defendant could plead that the action should be heard 
by the court of the Palatine.68 Or, if an action between scholars of 
Oxford or Cambridge was brought in a court of Westminster, the 
defendant could plead that jurisdiction properly belonged to the 
respective University.69 In other cases, a court to which the King had 
granted the privilege of determining an action could demand 
jurisdiction from the court in which the plaintiff originally brought the 
action.70 
 
pounds); An Act for Establishing a General Court, ch. 17, § 3 (Oct. 1777) in 9 THE STATUTES 
AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 55, at 401, 402 
(providing that the general court had original jurisdiction over actions “at common law” 
provided the value of the suit was not less than “ten pounds, or two thousand pounds of 
tobacco”). 
 67. As Bacon’s Abridgement explains, “every Thing is supposed to be done within the[] 
Jurisdiction [of a court of general jurisdiction], unless the contrary especially appears; on the 
other Hand, nothing shall be intended within the Jurisdiction of an Inferior Court, but what is 
expressly alledged.” 1 BACON, supra note 22, at 559. 
 68. See 4 id. at 32 (explaining that defendant could plead to the jurisdiction of a superior 
court if the “Action accrued within a County Palatine”). 
 69. See id. (explaining that defendant could plead to the jurisdiction of a superior court if 
the action was “between the Scholars of Oxford and Cambridge”). 
 70. Bacon’s Abridgement explains that “where a Franchise . . . hath a Privilege of holding 
Pleas within their Jurisdiction, if the Courts at Westminster intrench on their Privileges, they 
must demand Conuzance, that is, a desire that the Cause may be determined before them.” 1 id. 
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Unlike a court of general jurisdiction, a court of limited 
jurisdiction presumed itself to lack jurisdiction unless the plaintiff 
specifically demonstrated otherwise. To bring an action in a court of 
limited jurisdiction, the plaintiff had to specifically plead as part of 
the right or title asserted facts sufficient to show that the court had 
jurisdiction. Bacon’s Abridgment sets forth the principle as follows: 
Inferior Courts are bounded, in their original Creation, to Causes 
arising within such limited Jurisdiction: Hence it is necessary for 
them to set forth their Authority; for, as hath been already observed, 
nothing shall be intended within the Jurisdiction of an Inferior 
Court, but what is expressly alledged to be so.71 
Courts most commonly invoked this principle in determining 
whether cases were within the territorial jurisdiction of inferior 
courts. To have a case heard in an inferior court, the plaintiff had to 
specifically set forth in the declaration that the cause of action arose 
within the jurisdiction of the court. In Littleboy v. Wright,72 the King’s 
Bench invoked this principle to determine whether a case was within 
its territorial jurisdiction. The plaintiff brought an action of case in 
the Palace-Court against the defendant for saying, within the 
jurisdiction of the Palace-Court, that the plaintiff was a “hackney 
whore,” causing the plaintiff to lose her marriage.73 The King’s Bench 
held that the Palace-Court lacked jurisdiction over this action 
because, though the plaintiff alleged that the defendant called her a 
“hackney whore” within the court’s territorial jurisdiction, it was “not 
shewn, that the loss of marriage was within the jurisdiction of the 
Court, and that is the cause of the action, and not the speaking of the 
words only.”74 English courts invoked this pleading rule to hold that a 
cause of action did not arise within the jurisdiction of a court in many 
cases.75 
 
at 560. In such a case, the defendant could not plead to the jurisdiction of the Courts at 
Westminster, because the defendant remained subject to the King’s Writ; the holder of the 
franchise could demand jurisdiction based on the privilege that the king had granted to the 
holder. Id.; see also 4 id. at 33 (explaining the same principles). 
 71. 1 id. at 562. 
 72. Littleboy v. Wright, (1673) 83 Eng. Rep. 301 (K.B.). 
 73. Id. at 301. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Drake v. Beare, (1793) 83 Eng. Rep. 319, 319–20 (K.B.) (holding that the Court at 
Exeter lacked jurisdiction over an action of debt on a lease when the plaintiff did not plead that 
“the lands lay within the jurisdiction of the Court”); Price v. Hill, (1793) 83 Eng. Rep. 337, 337 
(K.B.) (holding that the Wallingford Court lacked jurisdiction over an action in assumpsit on a 
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The rule that a plaintiff had to specifically show in the initial 
pleading that a court of limited jurisdiction had jurisdiction applied to 
any kind of jurisdictional limitation. For example, when a plaintiff 
brought an action in the court of Stanneries on the ground of party 
status—in other words, that the plaintiff was a tinner—the plaintiff 
had to allege in the declaration that the plaintiff in fact was a tinner. 
In Reignol v. Taylor,76 the Queen’s Bench described as “error . . . that 
it was not alleged that the plaintiff was a tinner; and by several Acts of 
Parliament concerning their jurisdiction, they ought to shew it.”77 
When a plaintiff brought an action in the Court of the Constable and 
Earl Marshal, which had jurisdiction only if the common law did not 
operate as the governing source of the law, the plaintiff had to 
“declare plainly his matter in his petition” so as to demonstrate that 
the governing law was a source other than the common law.78 
Procedurally, there were various ways in which a court could 
come to determine that a court of limited jurisdiction lacked 
 
promise within the jurisdiction for goods sold because the plaintiff did “not show where the 
goods were sold and delivered”); Rowland v. Veale, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 944, 945 (K.B.) (“[I]f it 
was not alleged in the plaint below to be within the jurisdiction, it would have been bad on 
error . . . .”); Waldock v. Cooper, (1754) 95 Eng. Rep. 661, 661 (K.B.) (holding that the Borough 
Court of Aylesbury lacked jurisdiction over an action in assumpsit on a promise within the 
jurisdiction of the court because the plaintiff did not assert that delivery of the good was within 
the jurisdiction of the court); Wallis v. Squire, (1729) 84 Eng. Rep. 1232, 1232 (K.B.) (holding 
that the Court of Carlisle lacked jurisdiction over an action in assumpsit because it was not 
alleged that the goods were sold within the jurisdiction, “which is the contract on which the 
assumpsit in law arose”); Heely v. Ward, (1726) 86 Eng. Rep. 3, 3 (K.B.) (holding that the Court 
at Hull lacked jurisdiction over an action in assumpsit on a promise within the jurisdiction of the 
court because the plaintiff did not assert that the delivery of the good was within the jurisdiction 
of the court); Winford v. Powell, (1712) 92 Eng. Rep. 357, 358 (K.B.) (holding that the inferior 
court lacked jurisdiction because, in an indebitatus assumpsit action to recover for the 
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s pond to wash horses, the plaintiff failed to allege that the pond 
was within the court’s jurisdiction); Stanyon v. Davis, (1704) 87 Eng. Rep. 974, 975 (Q.B.) (per 
curiam) (determining jurisdiction based on where the “sole gît of the action” arose); Titley v. 
Foxall, (1758) 125 Eng. Rep. 1386, 1387 (C.P.D.) (“Here it is averred that the Court below has a 
jurisdiction of all actions of trespass upon the case arising within the town; it is sufficiently 
shewn in this plea that the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction . . . .”); Moravia v. Sloper, 
(1737) 125 Eng. Rep. 1039, 1041 (C.P.D.) (explaining that it is “necessary” for a plaintiff “to set 
forth that the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Court”); Anonymus, (1732) 94 
Eng. Rep. 645, 646 (“[I]f this valore recepto, which arose upon stating the account, extinguishes 
the mutual demands on the account; here’s a new cause of action arising, which should have 
been laid infra jurisdiction’, &c. but it does not, and therefore the assumpsit was brought for the 
original debt, which is laid to arise within the jurisdiction of the Court . . . .”). 
 76. Reignol v. Taylor, (1702) 87 Eng. Rep. 1124 (Q.B.). 
 77. Id. at 1124. 
 78. See 1 BACON, supra note 22, at 602–03 (reciting this prescription); COKE, THE FOURTH 
PART OF THE INSTITUTES, supra note 30, at 122–23 (same). 
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jurisdiction over a case. A court could dismiss a case for lack of 
jurisdiction because the plaintiff’s declaration did not make a 
sufficient jurisdictional showing.79 Or the defendant could plead that 
the court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to sufficiently 
demonstrate it.80 There is late-eighteenth-century authority that a 
plaintiff not only had to allege in the declaration that the cause of 
action arose within the jurisdiction of the court, but also had to prove 
upon the trial that it was properly within the jurisdiction of the 
court.81 Thus, if the plaintiff sought to prove facts in support of the 
right or title that would disprove the court’s jurisdiction, the court 
would not accept the evidence; if the court did accept the evidence, 
the defendant could tender a bill of exceptions upon which the 
judgment would be deemed erroneous.82 Finally, if the plaintiff failed 
to sufficiently show that the cause of action was within the jurisdiction 
of a court of limited jurisdiction, a superior court could remove the 
case from its jurisdiction by writ of prohibition.83 
In sum, as Lord Willes described the operation of these 
jurisdictional principles in Moravia v. Sloper,84 “a plaintiff may sue if 
he please in the Courts of Westminster-Hall and then he will be safe, 
but if he will sue in an Inferior Court he is bound at his peril to take 
notice of the bounds and limits of its jurisdiction.”85 
 
 79. See 4 BACON, supra note 22, at 33–34 (providing examples of cases in which this 
occurred). 
 80. See id. at 34–35 (discussing how defendants would plead to the jurisdiction of an 
inferior court). 
 81. See 1 id. at 563 (“[N]or is it sufficient to alledge the Cause of Action within the 
Jurisdiction of the Court; but it must be proved upon the Trial; and if the Plaintiff proves a 
Consideration out of the Jurisdiction it cannot be given in Evidence . . . .”); see also King v. 
Danser, (1795) 101 Eng. Rep. 533, 534–35 (K.B.) (Kenyon, C.J.) (“Generally speaking, nothing 
is clearer than that it is necessary, in inferior jurisdictions, that the cause of action must be laid 
and proved to arise within the jurisdiction . . . . But it appears from the evidence given that the 
cause of action did not arise within the jurisdiction of the court; and unless this Act of 
Parliament has given an action against all persons residing within the jurisdiction of Ecclesall, 
though the cause of action do not arise there, the general rule must apply to this case.”). 
 82. 4 BACON, supra note 22, at 33. 
 83. 1 id. at 564 (“[I]f any Matter appears in the Declaration, which sheweth that the Cause 
of Action did not arise infra Jurisdictionem, a Prohibition may be granted at any Time; so if the 
Subject Matter in the Declaration be not proper for the Judgment and Determination of such 
Court.”); 4 id. at 34 (describing the same principles). 
 84. Moravia v. Sloper, (1737) 125 Eng. Rep. 1039 (C.P.D.). 
 85. Id. at 1042. 
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B. Principles of Appellate Jurisdiction 
In addition to these principles of original jurisdiction, certain 
principles that governed the appellate jurisdiction of English courts in 
the eighteenth century provide useful background for understanding 
how federal courts came to understand the scope of Article III 
“arising under” jurisdiction. 
1. In England.  The Courts of Westminster—King’s Bench, 
Common Pleas, Exchequer, and Chancery, that is, the superior 
courts—not only exercised a general original jurisdiction, but also 
variously superintended the proceedings of inferior courts and each 
other by exercising appellate jurisdiction. As stated in Bacon’s 
Abridgement, “the Courts of Westminster are the Superior Courts of 
the Kingdom, and have a Superintendency over all the other Courts 
by Prohibitions, if they exceed their Jurisdiction, or Writs of Error 
and false Judgment, if their Proceedings are erroneous.”86 To bring an 
“appeal,” one had to file in a proper court in the proper form the writ 
or a bill that fit the “error” alleged. 
The principal forms of “appellate” proceedings “on the merits” 
were writs of error and bills of review. Writs of error ran from one 
court to another. In his Commentaries, Blackstone provided a 
convenient summary of the most significant principles governing 
which court or courts could hear writs of error based on the 
proceedings of other courts. Most notably, a writ of error would lie 
from an inferior court of record or the common pleas at Westminster 
to the King’s Bench.87 When a plaintiff in error sought the writ from a 
proper superior court, that court had power to review the entire 
record for any substantial or material error affecting the propriety of 
the judgment under review.88 To maintain a writ of error, a party had 
to assert an error that was “substantial” or “material,”89 not “slight”  
 
 
 86. 4 BACON, supra note 22, at 32. 
 87. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *410–11. 
 88. See 2 BACON, supra note 22, at 187 (“A Writ of Error is a Commission to Judges of a 
superior court, by which they are authorised to examine the Record, upon which a Judgment 
was given in an inferior Court, and on such Examination to affirm or reverse the same according 
to Law.”). 
 89. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *406 (explaining that “writs of error cannot now 
be maintained, but for some material mistake assigned”). 
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or “trivial,”90 such as a misspelling in a verdict or judgment.91 When a 
writ of error was properly sought, the reviewing court had jurisdiction 
to review matters of law “arising upon” the facts of the proceeding as 
evident in the record.92 
A bill of review was the functional equivalent of a writ of error 
for equity proceedings. A party seeking review of an original 
proceeding in equity would file a bill of review in the High Court of 
Chancery. A bill of review was “in the nature of a writ of error,” and 
its purpose was “to procure an examination, and alteration, or 
reversal of a decree made upon a former Bill.”93 A bill of review could 
be “had upon apparent error in judgment, appearing on the face of 
the [equitable] decree”94 or “upon oath made of the discovery of new 
matter or evidence” not available at the time the decree was made.95 
Other notable forms of proceeding by which one court would 
pass on the propriety of proceedings in another were writs of 
prohibition and certiorari. Blackstone described prohibition as a writ 
“directed to the judge and parties, of a suit in any inferior court, 
commanding them to cease from the prosecution thereof, upon a 
suggestion, that either the cause originally, or some collateral matter 
arising therein, does not belong to that jurisdiction, but to the 
cognizance of some other court.”96 Bacon’s Abridgement explains in 
this regard that if inferior “courts assume a greater or other power 
than is allowed them by law, or if they refuse to allow acts of 
parliament, or expound them otherwise than according to the true 
and proper exposition of them, the superior courts will prohibit and 
control them” through prohibition.97 Certiorari was “an original Writ 
issuing out of Chancery, or the King’s Bench, directed in the King’s 
Name, to the Judges or Officers . . . of Inferior Courts, commanding 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at *410. 
 92. Id. at *406. 
 93. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS 320 (2d ed. 1840). 
 94. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *454; see also STORY, supra note 93, at 322 
(explaining that a bill of review “may be brought for error of law, appearing upon the face of 
the decree”). 
 95. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *454; see also STORY, supra note 93, at 327 (“[T]he 
matter must not only be new, but it must be such, as the party, by the use of reasonable 
diligence, could not have known . . . .”). 
 96. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *112. 
 97. 6 BACON, supra note 22, at 250. 
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them to return the Records of a Cause depending before them.”98 
King’s Bench or Chancery would grant certiorari in favor of the 
Crown as a matter of right, and had discretion to grant the writ in 
favor of others upon a showing that a party would receive “hard 
dealing”99 or “not have equal Justice”100 in an inferior court.101 
2. In the Colonies.  In colonial legal systems, governing laws 
provided that certain courts should have general appellate jurisdiction 
over the proceedings of inferior courts. For example, a 1699 New 
Hampshire act established a superior court at Portsmouth with 
jurisdiction over all “matters, as fully and amply to all intents and 
purposes whatsoever, as the Courts of King’s Bench, Common Pleas 
and Exchequer, within His Majesties Kingdom of England have, or 
ought to have,” including appellate matters.102 Some colonial laws 
limited the jurisdiction of courts to hear matters on appeal according 
to the amount in controversy in a given dispute. For example, a 1748 
New Jersey act provided that a party “aggrieved” by an inferior court 
judgment “for the Sum of Twenty Shillings or more,” could appeal “to 
the next Court of Common-Pleas, to be held for the County, City or 
Town Corporate, after the Judgment given.”103 
 
 98. 1 id. at 349. 
 99. JOHN COWEL, A LAW DICTIONARY (London, J. Streater 1672) (describing certiorari as 
“a Writ . . . to an Inferior Court, to call up the Records of a Cause therein depending, that 
conscionable Justice may be therein administered upon Complaint made by Bill, that the Party 
which seeketh the said Writ, hath received hard dealing in the said Court”). 
 100. JOHN RASTELL, LES TERMES DE LA LEY 106 (London, Eliz. Nutt & R. Gosling 1721) 
(describing certiorari as “a Writ that lies where a Man is impleaded in a base Court, that is of 
Record, and he supposes that he may not have equal justice there”). 
 101. Relatedly, the writ of accedas ad curiam was appropriate for removal of a case from a 
court not of record into a royal court so that a record of the suit could be made. See WILLIAM 
BOHUN, THE ENGLISH LAWYER: SHEWING THE NATURE AND FORMS OF ORIGINAL WRITS, 
PROCESSES AND MANDATES, OF THE COURTS OF WESTMINSTER 415 (London, E. Nutt, R. Nutt 
& R. Gosling 1732) (“An Accedas ad Curiam is an Original Writ issuing out of Chancery, on a 
Plaint sued, or a Judgment supposed to be given in the Hundred-Court, Court-Baron, or other 
Court of some Lord . . . being no Court of Record, commanding the Court to make a Record of 
the same suit, and to return and certify the same . . . .”). 
 102. An Act for Establishing and Regulating Courts of Public Justice Within This Province, 
ch. 4 (Aug. 17, 1699), in 1 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 48, at 662, 663. 
 103. An Act to Erect and Establish Courts in the Several Counties of This Colony, for the 
Trial of Small Causes, ch. 100, § 2 (1748), in THE ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE 
PROVINCE OF NEW-JERSEY, supra note 65, at 388, 388. Although “appellate” courts in England 
were not subject to this kind of amount-in-controversy requirement, a plaintiff in error had 
certain procedural obligations in pursuing a writ of error if the amount in controversy was 
sufficiently low. Specifically, a plaintiff in error who sought to reverse an inferior court 
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Interestingly, royal commissions and acts of colonial legislatures 
also provided amount-in-controversy limitations on the jurisdiction of 
the Privy Council to hear appeals from the colonies.104 Several royal 
charters provided that persons in the colonies could appeal from 
judgments rendered by courts in the colonies to the Privy Council in 
England in limited circumstances. For example, the 1691 Charter of 
Massachusetts Bay provided that a party could appeal in a personal 
action from the judgment or sentence of any court in the province 
when the amount in dispute exceeded £300.105 Royal instructions to 
colonial governors in the eighteenth century similarly regulated 
appeals from colonial courts to governors and the Privy Council, 
providing amount-in-dispute requirements.106 Certain colonial 
assemblies also purported to set limitations on rights to appeal to the 
King in Council. A 1746 act in Rhode Island, for instance, provided 
that a person aggrieved by a decision of the Supreme Court of 
Judicature could appeal to the King in Council if the amount in 
controversy was £150.107 
 
judgment awarding damages less than ten pounds had to post security to protect the defendant 
in error from a frivolous appeal or threat of appeal. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *410. 
 104. Under various enactments, the Privy Council served as a court of last resort for appeals 
in colonial judicial systems. See generally JOSEPH HENRY SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY 
COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS 76–87, 246–48 (1950) (describing such acts and 
limitations). 
 105. The Charter of Massachusetts Bay (1691), reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 1870, 1881–82 (Francis 
Newton Thorpe ed., 1909). 
 106. A typical instruction provided that a party dissatisfied with a judgment could appeal 
unto us in our Privy Council, provided the matter in difference exceed the real value 
of THREE hundred pounds sterling, AND that such appeal be made within one 
fortnight after SENTENCE and security first given by the appellant to answer such 
charges as shall be awarded in case the sentence of our governor or commander in 
chief and council be confirmed. 
Regulation of Appeals to the Council and Crown, reprinted in 1 ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS TO 
BRITISH COLONIAL GOVERNORS 1670–1776, § 446, at 320 (Leonard Woods Labaree ed., 1935). 
This instruction applied to the colonies of Maryland, New Hampshire, and Virginia. For other 
examples of such royal instructions, see Appeals to the Privy Council, in 1 ROYAL 
INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH COLONIAL GOVERNORS 1670–1776, supra, § 449, at 322, and 
Appeals to Governor and Council and to Privy Council, in 1 ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH 
COLONIAL GOVERNORS 1670–1776, supra, § 453, at 325. 
 107. See SMITH, supra note 104, at 246–48 (describing Rhode Island laws). Subsequent acts 
raised this amount to £200 lawful money in 1766 and £300 lawful money in 1771. See id. at 247–
48. There was a question, of course, whether such colonial acts were binding on the King in 
Council, see id. at 248, but what is relevant for present purposes is the nature of the regulation 
enacted, not the authority of the institution that enacted it. Both royal authorities and colonial 
assemblies imposed—or purported to impose—the same kind of limitations on the Privy 
Council to hear appeals from courts in the colonies. 
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Just as a plaintiff bringing an original action in a court of limited 
jurisdiction had to demonstrate in the original pleading that the court 
had jurisdiction, an aggrieved party seeking review in the Privy 
Council had to demonstrate that the amount in controversy sufficed 
to satisfy amount-in-controversy limitations. In the 1768 case of 
Ferguson v. Spry, the South Carolina Court of Chancery, in 
explaining that the plaintiff was appealing the dismissal of his case to 
the Privy Council, specifically noted that there was an “[a]ffidavit by 
plaintiff that the matter in dispute is of £300 value and upwards.”108 
Likewise, the report of Stocker v. Rowand noted that after the South 
Carolina Court of Chancery issued a decree resolving the case, the 
defendant submitted an affidavit “that he is not satisfied with the 
decree, that the matter exceeds £300 in value, and he seeks an appeal 
to his Majesty in Privy Council.”109 This practice comports with the 
opinion of the Supreme Court, expressed in 1808, that, with respect to 
amount-in-dispute limitations on its own appellate jurisdiction, “the 
plaintiff in error must show that this court has jurisdiction.”110 
In sum, during the decades preceding the establishment of the 
Constitution, English and colonial laws recognized a distinction 
between courts of general and limited jurisdiction. When a plaintiff 
brought an original proceeding in a court of limited jurisdiction, the 
plaintiff had the burden of demonstrating facts sufficient to show that 
the court had jurisdiction. Likewise, the available evidence suggests 
that litigants bringing an appellate proceeding in a court of limited 
appellate jurisdiction had to show that the jurisdictional limitation 
was satisfied. 
II.  THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION HISTORY OF ARTICLE III 
To understand how early federal courts explained Article III 
“arising under” jurisdiction, one must appreciate not only the English 
jurisdictional principles explained in Part I, but also the framing and 
ratification of Article III. 
This Part first explains how, at the Federal Convention, the 
delegates came to include the Arising Under Clause as a means of 
 
 108. RECORDS OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF SOUTH CAROLINA 566 (Anne King 
Gregorie ed., 1950). 
 109. Id. at 568–69. 
 110. United States v. Brig Union, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 216, 216 (1808) (“[T]he circuit court can 
neither give nor take away the jurisdiction of this court. The court must judge for itself of its 
own jurisdiction.”). 
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ensuring the supremacy of federal law through national courts. It then 
explains how, in debates over ratification, public officials described 
“arising under” jurisdiction as enabling federal courts to ensure the 
supremacy of federal law by properly enforcing it and maintaining its 
uniformity. 
In examining the framing and ratification of “arising under” 
jurisdiction, this Part sets aside for the moment the English 
jurisdictional law just explained. Part III will explain the relationship 
between English jurisdictional law and the framing and ratification of 
Article III “arising under” jurisdiction. That relationship, in short, is 
this: Federal courts in the early nineteenth century would come to 
rely upon English jurisdictional principles in effectuating the purposes 
of “arising under” jurisdiction evident in the framing and ratification 
of Article III. When federal courts employed English rules to 
determine jurisdiction, they observed a practice that at once enabled 
them to ensure the supremacy of federal law but checked the extent 
to which they independently would encroach upon the jurisdiction of 
state courts. Before examining federal judicial practice, however, it is 
first necessary, as context, to examine the place of “arising under” 
jurisdiction in the framing and ratification of the Constitution. 
A. The Framing History 
There is no need to recount here all that is known about the 
framing history of Article III. The delegates to the Federal 
Convention of 1787 considered several questions regarding the 
judicial power of the United States, including who should appoint 
federal judges; what power Congress should have over the jurisdiction 
of federal courts; and, most famously, leading to the so-called 
“Madisonian Compromise,” whether the Constitution should create 
inferior federal courts.111 Because the specific concern of this Article is 
with the import of Article III “arising under” jurisdiction, this Section 
presents a streamlined framing history focused on that particular 
jurisdictional grant.112 This history reveals that Article III “arising 
 
 111. See Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided 
Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 757–96 (1984) 
(explaining the general framing history of Article III). 
 112. For a more extensive consideration, see James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some 
Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 705–73 (1998). 
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under” jurisdiction emerged as a mechanism for ensuring, along with 
the Supremacy Clause, the proper enforcement of federal law. 
1. The Plans of the Convention.  At the Federal Convention, the 
delegates commonly assumed that the United States would exercise a 
judicial power; the question was what form it would take. Under the 
Articles of Confederation, the federal judicial power extended to 
certain maritime disputes113 and disputes between states.114 Each of the 
plans put forward at the Convention contemplated, consistent with 
the Convention’s overall purpose, that the national government 
would have more extensive judicial powers than those provided in the 
Articles of Confederation. To understand the jurisdiction that each 
plan would have given a national judiciary, it is useful to appreciate 
what powers each plan would have vested in a national legislature 
and what mechanisms each plan would have provided to ensure the 
supremacy of federal prerogatives. 
The “Virginia Plan,” as put forth by Edmund Randolph on May 
29, 1787, would have empowered a national legislature “to legislate in 
all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the 
harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of 
individual Legislation.”115 To ensure the supremacy of federal 
prerogatives, Randolph’s plan provided three primary mechanisms. 
First, it would have empowered the national legislature “to negative 
all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of 
the National Legislature the articles of Union.”116 Second, it would 
have empowered the legislature “to call forth the force of the Union” 
against states that failed to fulfill their duties under the articles of the 
 
 113. Article IX provided: 
The United States in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and 
power of . . . appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the 
high seas and establishing courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all 
cases of captures provided that no member of Congress shall be appointed a judge of 
any of the said courts. 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, para. 1 (U.S. 1781). 
 114. Article IX provided that the Confederation Congress would serve as “the last resort on 
appeal in all disputes and differences now subsisting or that hereafter may arise between two or 
more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any other causes whatever,” id. art. IX, para. 
2, and certain controversies “concerning the private right of soil claimed under different grants 
of two or more States,” id. art. IX, para. 3. 
 115. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 20–21 (Max Farrand ed., 
rev. ed. 1966). 
 116. Id. at 21. 
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plan.117 Third, it provided for a national judiciary with jurisdiction 
over several categories of cases. 
The judiciary provision, like all proposals for federal jurisdiction 
introduced at the Convention, defined national judicial jurisdiction 
according to the kinds of categories that limited jurisdiction in 
English and colonial law. Specifically, the Virginia Plan defined 
categories of federal jurisdiction according to the nature of the action 
being brought, the character of the litigants or other interested 
parties, the subject matter to which the action related, or some 
combination of these categories: 
[T]he jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear & 
determine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear 
& determine in the dernier resort, all piracies & felonies on the high 
seas, captures from an enemy; cases in which foreigners or citizens 
of other States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested, or 
which respect the collection of the National revenue; impeachments 
of any National officers, and questions which may involve the 
national peace and harmony.118 
This final category—“questions which may involve the national peace 
and harmony”—roughly corresponded in language to the power the 
plan would have given the national legislature in cases “in which the 
harmony of the United States may be interrupted by state 
legislation.”119 In other words, the plan contemplated a jurisdiction 
coterminous with the national legislative power. 
Debate ensued on the famous question whether a supreme 
national tribunal with appellate jurisdiction over state courts was 
sufficient to protect national prerogatives from state interference, or 
whether inferior national tribunals were needed in addition. The 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 22. 
 119. At the time that Randolph presented his plan, Charles Pinckney offered a different 
one. The content of Pinckney’s plan has long been controversial, but, on one theory, he 
proposed a federal court with appellate jurisdiction “in all Causes wherein Questions shall arise 
on the Construction of Treaties made by U.S.—or on the Law of Nations—or on the 
Regulations of U.S. concerning Trade and Revenue.” 3 id. at 608 (emphasis in original omitted) 
(emphasis added). By its terms, this plan provided appellate jurisdiction over disputed questions 
of the meaning of federal law and the law of nations. In his Observations on the Plan of 
Government Submitted to the Federal Convention, published after the Convention concluded, 
Pinckney explained that a federal judiciary was necessary not only for the trial of impeachments 
of officers of the United States, but for “the trial of questions arising on the law of nations, the 
construction of treaties, or any of the regulations of Congress in pursuance of their powers.” Id. 
at 117 (emphasis added). 
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delegates generally agreed that a supreme national tribunal was 
necessary to protect certain defined national interests; they disagreed 
about whether a supreme tribunal without national courts of original 
jurisdiction was sufficient. On June 5, the Committee of the Whole 
passed the initial “Madisonian Compromise,” a motion “[t]hat the 
national legislature be empowered to appoint inferior Tribunals.”120 
On June 13, 1787, Randolph and James Madison presented an 
amended plan providing “[t]hat the jurisdiction of the national 
Judiciary shall extend to cases which respect the collection of the 
national revenue, impeachments of any national officers, and 
questions which involve the national peace and harmony.”121 
Reportedly, Randolph “observed the difficulty in establishing the 
powers of the judiciary,” but understood the object of federal judicial 
power to be “to establish . . . the security of foreigners where treaties 
are in their favor, and to preserve the harmony of states and that of 
the citizens thereof.”122 According to Randolph, this amended plan 
would simply establish that principle; it would later “be the business 
of a sub-committee to detail it.”123 The Committee unanimously 
adopted the proposal and, that same day, reprinted the Virginia Plan 
as revised.124 
Two days later, on June 15, William Paterson put forth the so-
called “New Jersey Plan.” This plan would have augmented the 
powers of Congress under the Articles of Confederation to include 
powers to raise revenues and regulate trade and commerce.125 To 
ensure the supremacy of federal prerogatives, Paterson’s plan 
provided three mechanisms: a supremacy clause, a national judiciary, 
and the use of force. 
First, Paterson’s plan provided that “acts” and “treaties” of the 
United States were “the supreme law of the respective States”: 
[A]ll Acts of the U. States in Congs. made by virtue & in pursuance 
of the powers hereby & by the articles of confederation vested in 
them, and all Treaties made & ratified under the authority of the U. 
States shall be the supreme law of the respective States so far forth 
as those Acts or Treaties shall relate to the said States or their 
 
 120. 1 id. at 115–18. 
 121. Id. at 223–24 (emphasis added). 
 122. Id. at 238. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 228–32, 235–37. 
 125. Id. at 242–43. 
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Citizens, and that the Judiciary of the several States shall be bound 
thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the 
Individual States to the contrary notwithstanding.126 
Second, it provided for a national judiciary with appellate 
jurisdiction over limited categories of state court judgments 
implicating national interests. Specifically, it provided that “all 
punishments, fines, forfeitures & penalties to be incurred for 
contravening” acts of Congress “shall be adjudged” by state courts, 
subject to “appeal to the Judiciary of the U. States” for “the 
correction of all errors, both in law & fact.”127 Correspondingly, the 
plan would have given a federal “supreme Tribunal” appellate 
jurisdiction “in all cases . . . which may arise on any of the Acts for 
regulation of trade, or the collection of the federal Revenue.”128 
Paterson’s plan additionally would have given the supreme tribunal 
limited appellate jurisdiction in other categories of cases implicating 
national interests, including “all cases touching the rights of 
Ambassadors, in all cases of captures from an enemy, in all cases of 
piracies & felonies on the high seas, in all cases in which foreigners 
may be interested, [and] in the construction of any treaty or 
treaties . . . .”129 
Finally, Paterson’s plan would have provided for the use of force 
against states resisting federal authority.130 Notwithstanding that the 
Virginia Plan itself initially contained a force provision, Randolph, 
Madison, and Alexander Hamilton each denounced the force 
provision in the New Jersey Plan.131 Rather than force, Madison 
advocated a congressional negative on state legislation as the 
 
 126. Id. at 245. 
 127. Id. at 243. 
 128. Id. at 244 (emphasis added). 
 129. Id. at 244. Charles Pinckney also presented a plan to the Convention that would have 
established a supreme federal court and such inferior federal courts “as shall be necessary.” 3 id. 
at 600. 
 130. 1 id. at 245. 
 131. Randolph expressed that such “coercion” was “impracticable, expensive, cruel to 
individuals.” Id. at 255–56 (Madison’s notes from June 16, 1787). Hamilton questioned “how 
can this force be exerted on the States collectively. It is impossible. It amounts to a war between 
the parties. Foreign powers also will not be idle spectators. They will interpose, the confusion 
will increase, and a dissolution of the Union ensue.” Id. at 285. Madison, too, expressed that 
“[t]he coercion, on which the efficacy of the plan depends, can never be exerted but on 
themselves.” Id. at 320. 
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appropriate means of ensuring federal supremacy.132 Following 
deliberations on the New Jersey Plan, the Committee of the Whole 
voted to report the Virginia Plan, rather than the New Jersey Plan, to 
the convention. 
2. A Supremacy Provision and “Arising Under” Jurisdiction as 
Alternative Means to Enforce Federal Supremacy.  After rejecting the 
New Jersey Plan, the delegates proceeded to debate the provisions of 
the Virginia Plan on the floor of the Convention. Ultimately, the 
Convention would reject a negative in favor of judicial mechanisms 
for enforcing federal supremacy. In a letter dated June 20, 1787, that 
Madison likely received in August 1787, Thomas Jefferson, writing 
from Paris, discussed these competing mechanisms.133 Jefferson 
argued that federal court jurisdiction over cases that federal law 
controlled would be preferable to the negative as a means of 
preventing states from thwarting federal prerogatives. Arguing 
against the negative, Jefferson asked, “Would not an appeal from the 
State Judicatures to a Federal Court, in all cases where the Act of 
Confederation controuled the question, be as effectual a remedy, and 
exactly commensurate to the defect?”134 (By “Act of Confederation,” 
Jefferson meant not only the articles of union, but laws made 
pursuant to them.135) Jefferson anticipated that “[i]t will be said that 
this Court may encroach on the jurisdiction of the State Courts,”136 
but retorted that “there will be a power, to wit Congress, to watch 
and restrain them.”137 The Convention ultimately would provide a 
stronger mechanism than Jefferson advocated—a congressional 
power to constitute inferior federal courts in addition to Supreme 
 
 132. Madison thought that “[t]he plan of Mr. Paterson, not giving even a negative on the 
Acts of the States, left them as much at liberty as ever to execute their unrighteous projects agst. 
each other.” Id. at 318. 
 133. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (June 20, 1787), in CHARLES 
WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 168, 168–69 (1928). 
 134. Id. 
 135. By way of example, Jefferson explained: 
A British creditor, e.g., sues for his debt in Virginia; the defendant pleads an act of 
the State excluding him from their Courts; the plaintiff urges the Confederation and 
the treaty made under that, as controuling the State law; the [State] Judges are weak 
enough to decide according to the views of their Legislature; an appeal to a Federal 
Court sets all to rights. 
Id. at 169. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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Court appellate jurisdiction. In principle, however, Jefferson’s 
expressed preference for a judicial rather than legislative check on 
state encroachments against federal power would carry the day. 
On July 17, after the States secured equal suffrage in the 
Senate,138 the Convention debated the merits of the negative. Madison 
considered the negative “essential to the efficacy & security of the 
Genl. Govt.”139 Only a negative would counteract “the propensity of 
the States to pursue their particular interests in opposition to the 
general interest.”140 Federal judicial review would not be as effective, 
in Madison’s view, because state laws could “accomplish their 
injurious objects” before they could be “set aside by the National 
Tribunals.”141 Moreover, Madison argued that “[c]onfidence can 
<not> be put in the State Tribunals as guardians of the National 
authority and interests” because of the control state legislatures 
exercised over them.142 
Roger Sherman and Robert Morris argued against a negative. 
Sherman contended it was unnecessary, “as the Courts of the States 
would not consider as valid any law contravening the Authority of the 
Union, and which the legislature would wish to be negatived.”143 And 
Morris asserted that the national judiciary would adequately protect 
federal prerogatives against obstructive state laws.144 
The Convention proceeded to reject the negative. Thereupon, 
the Convention took up other measures for ensuring the supremacy 
of federal prerogatives. Immediately after the Convention rejected 
the negative, Luther Martin proposed “in substitution of” a 
negative145 a supremacy provision that tracked the supremacy 
provision that Paterson’s plan had contained: 
[T]he legislative acts of the United States made by virtue and in 
pursuance of the articles of the union, and all treaties made and 
ratified under the authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme law of the respective states, so far as those acts or treaties 
 
 138. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 115, at 15–16. 
 139. Id. at 27. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. He explained that “[a] law that ought to be negatived will be set aside in the Judiciary 
departmt.” Id. at 28. 
 145. 3 id. at 286. 
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shall relate to the said states or their citizens and that the judiciaries 
of the several states shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any 
thing in the respective laws of the individual states to the contrary 
notwithstanding.146 
As under the supremacy clause of Paterson’s plan, state judiciaries 
would be bound by national “acts” and “treaties” as “the supreme 
law of the respective States.” The Convention unanimously adopted 
this supremacy provision. 
Having defined an obligation in state courts to recognize the 
supremacy of federal law, the Convention next took up the role of a 
national judiciary in maintaining the supremacy of federal law. The 
delegates unanimously agreed that the United States should have a 
judiciary. Their debate primarily concerned whether the judiciary 
should have just a supreme tribunal or inferior courts as well, what 
the procedure should be for appointment of judges, and what power 
Congress should have regarding judicial salaries. Regarding the 
question of inferior federal tribunals, opponents argued that state 
courts could adequately handle in the first instance any business to 
which a federal judicial power would extend.147 Luther Martin, who 
had introduced the supremacy provision, argued that inferior federal 
tribunals “will create jealousies & oppositions in the State tribunals, 
with the jurisdiction of which they will interfere.”148 In response, 
Randolph argued that inferior federal tribunals were necessary to 
maintain the supremacy of federal law. He “observed that the Courts 
of the States can not be trusted with the administration of the 
National laws. The objects of jurisdiction are such as will often place 
the General & local policy at variance.”149 As is well known, the 
Convention resolved, as the Committee of the Whole had on June 5, 
to authorize Congress to establish inferior federal tribunals rather 
than provide directly for them in the Constitution.150 
After this resolution, the Convention adopted a resolution 
proposed by Madison that federal court jurisdiction extend to “cases 
arising under laws passed by the general Legislature, and to such 
 
 146. Id. at 286–87. 
 147. 2 id. at 45. 
 148. Id. at 45–46. 
 149. Id. at 46. 
 150. Id. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (describing June 5 resolution of the 
Committee of the Whole). 
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other questions as involve the National peace and harmony.”151 In 
terms, this resolution drew a distinction between cases “arising 
under” national acts and questions that “involve the National peace 
and harmony.” Presumably, Madison particularized the “arising 
under” category of jurisdiction to make certain, after the defeat of the 
negative, that Congress would have power to enable inferior federal 
courts to administer federal law in the first instance as a means of 
maintaining its supremacy. Luther Martin suggested as much in his 
famous “Information to the General Assembly of the State of 
Maryland.” There, he explained that he thought that state court 
jurisdiction would be sufficient “in the first instance of all cases that 
should arise under the laws of the general government, which being 
by this system made the supreme law of the States, would be binding 
on the different State judiciaries.”152 The “majority” of delegates, 
however, he explained, thought that inferior federal courts were 
necessary “for the enforcing of [federal] laws.”153 What other 
categories of cases were necessary to preserve the national peace and 
harmony would be left to the Committee of Detail. The convention 
referred the Virginia Plan, as amended, to the Committee of Detail 
on July 26. 
As James Liebman and William Ryan summarize it, the 
Convention, in this plan, devised a “judicial review device” to take 
the “place of federal legislative review of state laws for consistency 
with national law.”154 The plan required state judiciaries to deem 
federal acts and treaties supreme, and, through the “arising under” 
provision, authorized Congress to deploy original and appellate 
federal court jurisdiction as necessary to supplement the obligations 
of state courts to enforce federal laws. 
3. Strengthening the Supremacy Provision and “Arising Under” 
Jurisdiction as Means to Enforce Federal Supremacy.  Through the 
remainder of its proceedings, the Convention would conform the 
language of the Supremacy Clause to the language of the Arising 
Under Clause, strengthening the efficacy of both. 
 
 151. Id. at 38–39. 
 152. Luther Martin, Information to the General Assembly of the State of Maryland, reprinted 
in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 27, 57 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 112, at 733. 
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In the Committee of Detail, Edmund Randolph submitted a 
draft proposal for national judicial jurisdiction containing notations 
by John Rutledge. This proposal maintained the “arising under” 
category and subdivided the category of “cases involving the national 
peace and harmony” into more specific categories defined by subject 
matter and party status: 
7. The jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall extend 
1. to all cases, arising under laws passed by the general 
<Legislature> 
2. to impeachments of officers, and 
3. to such other cases, as the national legislature may assign, as 
involving the national peace and harmony, in the collection 
of the revenue in disputes between citizens of different states 
<in disputes between a State & a Citizen or Citizens of 
another State> in disputes between different states; and in 
disputes, in which subjects or citizens of other countries are 
concerned <& in Cases of Admiralty Jurisdn> But this 
supreme jurisdiction shall be appellate only, except in <Cases 
of Impeachmt. & (in)> those instances, in which the 
legislature shall make it original. and the legislature shall 
organize it 
8. The whole or a part of the jurisdiction aforesaid according to the 
discretion of the legislature may be assigned to the inferior 
tribunals, as original tribunals.155 
This proposal drew a clear distinction between cases “arising under” 
federal law and other cases implicating national interests.156 
A later draft in the Committee of Detail, in James Wilson’s hand, 
with emendations in Rutledge’s hand, more closely resembles the 
form that Article III ultimately would assume. The article governing 
the judiciary began: “The Judicial Power of the United States shall be 
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as shall, 
when necessary, from time to time, be constituted by the Legislature 
of the United States.”157 Regarding jurisdiction, it provided, first, for 
 
 155. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 115, at 146–47 
(words in parentheses were crossed out in the original; words in brackets represent Rutledge’s 
emendations and marginal notes). 
 156. Another draft in the Committee of Detail, in James Wilson’s hand, used the phrase 
“arise on” rather than “arising under” to specify a limited category of cases over which the 
federal judiciary would have jurisdiction. Id. at 157. This proposal was evidently premised upon 
Paterson’s proposal for federal jurisdiction in the New Jersey Plan. 
 157. Id. at 186. 
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“arising under” jurisdiction: “The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
shall extend to all cases arising under laws passed by the Legislature 
of the United States.” It provided, as well, familiar categories based 
on the character of the parties (cases involving ambassadors and 
consuls, and diversity cases) and the kind of action being brought 
(impeachments, admiralty and maritime matters).158 This was 
essentially the draft that the Committee of Detail reported to the 
Convention on August 6, 1787. 
Debate ensued in the Convention on various matters relating to 
the supremacy of federal law and, in particular, the judiciary article.159 
On August 23, John Rutledge moved, and the Convention 
unanimously agreed, to extend the supremacy provision to encompass 
not only federal acts and treaties, but the Constitution itself.160 A 
motion to renew consideration of the negative failed that same day.161 
On August 27, the Convention conformed the language of the 
Arising Under Clause to the language of the Supremacy Clause. First, 
William Samuel Johnson “moved to insert the words ‘this 
Constitution and the’ before the word ‘laws.’”162 In response, 
Madison’s notes provide: 
Mr. Madison doubted whether it was not going too far to extend the 
jurisdiction of the Court generally to cases arising Under the 
Constitution, & whether it ought not to be limited to cases of a 
Judiciary Nature. The right of expounding the Constitution in cases 
not of this nature ought not to be given to that Department. 
The motion of Docr. Johnson was agreed to nem: con: it being 
generally supposed that the jurisdiction given was constructively 
limited to cases of a Judiciary nature—163 
According to Madison’s notes, Rutledge then moved to also 
include cases arising under “treaties made or which shall be made” 
under the authority of the United States. This inclusion would 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. These matters included extending the judicial power to cases “in law and equity,” 
legislative control over judicial salaries, and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to 
review questions of fact. 
 160. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 115, at 381–82, 
389, 394–95, 409. 
 161. Id. at 382, 391. 
 162. Id. at 430. 
 163. Id. 
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conform the language of the Arising Under Clause to the language of 
the Supremacy Clause.164 The delegates unanimously agreed to this 
motion.165 With this, and a few subsequent syntactical changes to the 
language of Article III, the delegates framed the Arising Under 
Clause. As James Liebman and William Ryan have summarized the 
process, the Framers “self-consciously and irrevocably forged the 
constitutional structural link between the front-line decisionmaking 
of ‘the Judges in every State’ under the supremacy clause and the 
supervisory decisionmaking of the federal judiciary when called upon 
to exercise the ‘arising under’ jurisdiction permitted by the judiciary 
article.”166 Relative to the negative (or use of force for that matter), 
the Arising Under Clause provided a limited means for Congress, 
through the judiciary, to ensure the supremacy of federal law. 
B. The Ratification History 
Several participants in ratification debates attributed a meaning 
and purpose to the Arising Under Clause that reflected its import in 
the Federal Convention. This Section describes the universe of 
recorded ways in which participants in the ratification debates—
proponents and opponents of the Constitution alike—defined the 
scope of Article III “arising under” jurisdiction. Those who defined it 
in a meaningful way deemed it to capture cases involving the 
enforcement or interpretation of federal law. This Section also 
describes the different reasons that ratification debate participants 
offered to explain the existence of Article III “arising under” 
jurisdiction. They argued that the Constitution must enable federal 
courts to properly carry federal law into execution and explicate its 
meaning. These definitions and reasoned justifications all envisioned 
 
 164. Id. at 431. As Madison explained it in his report on the Virginia Resolutions, the 
Arising Under Clause “was meant as a guide to the judges of the United States,” the Supremacy 
Clause “as a guide to the judges of the several states.” James Madison, Report on the Virginia 
Resolutions to the House of Delegates (1798), reprinted in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL 
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546, 565 (Jonathan 
Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co., 2d ed. 1891). 
 165. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 115, at 431. 
 166. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 112, at 747; see also Robert J. Pushaw Jr., Article III’s 
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 447, 498–99 (1994) (explaining that for the Framers, a national judiciary with “arising 
under” jurisdiction was needed “horizontally, to preserve uniformity in federal law, and 
vertically, to ensure federal supremacy” (internal citations omitted)). 
01__BELLIA.DOC 12/6/2007  8:42:34 AM 
2007] “ARISING UNDER” JURISDICTION 305 
federal courts maintaining the supremacy of federal law through 
“arising under” jurisdiction. 
Before this Section proceeds to discuss these materials, it is 
worth making two preliminary points. First, the meaning of Article III 
“arising under” jurisdiction did not dominate ratification debates 
about the federal judicial power. More than they discussed “arising 
under” jurisdiction, participants in the ratification debates addressed 
issues involving the right to a jury trial in federal court, the 
convenience of federal tribunals to potentially distant litigants, the 
jurisdiction of federal courts over cases “in law and equity,” and the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review questions of both “law 
and fact.” Participants made most assertions or assumptions about the 
scope of “arising under” jurisdiction in broader debates over the 
nature of the judicial power and the existence of judicial review. 
Second, the political nature of the ratification debates, including the 
place of The Federalist in them,167 is well known. There is every reason 
to believe that certain expressions of constitutional understanding 
were calculated toward political ends. The political nature of the 
ratification debates raises questions regarding whether a given 
statement fairly depicts how the speaker or listener most reasonably 
would have construed constitutional meaning. 
It might be asked, then, what evidence, if any, the ratification 
debates meaningfully hold regarding historical understandings of 
Article III “arising under” jurisdiction. If nothing else, the ratification 
debates evidence bounds of reasonable argumentation about the 
meaning of Article III “arising under” jurisdiction. In other words, 
even if some participants overstated or understated their actual 
understandings of the breadth of Article III “arising under” 
jurisdiction, their debates still may show how far participants believed 
they could carry an argument about constitutional import without 
exceeding the limits of plausibility. If the debates do not evidence a 
right answer to the question of what the scope of “arising under” 
jurisdiction was understood to be, they may well evidence what would 
have been understood to be wrong answers. Certainly, the ratification 
debates provide context for understanding the purposes of “arising 
under” jurisdiction that the Marshall Court attributed to its original 
establishment. 
 
 167. See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, A Rhetoric for Ratification: The Argument of The Federalist 
and Its Impact on Constitutional Interpretation, 56 DUKE L.J. 469, 486–527 (2006) (arguing that 
“The Federalist embodies a strategic argument designed to win an intense political campaign”). 
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1. The Meaning of “Arising Under” Jurisdiction.  This Section 
explains the different ways in which ratification debate participants 
defined or understood the phrase “arising under” in Article III. To 
begin, several participants complained that the phrase “arising under” 
was vague and indefinite. The debate in the Virginia ratifying 
convention provides illustrations. There, William Grayson objected 
“to the Federal Judiciary” on the ground “that it is not expressed in a 
definite manner.”168 In particular, he argued, “[t]he jurisdiction of all 
cases arising under the Constitution, and the laws of the Union, is of 
stupendous magnitude. It is impossible for human nature to trace its 
extent. It is so vaguely and indefinitely expressed, that its latitude 
cannot be ascertained.”169 George Mason observed that “[t]he Judicial 
power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under this 
Constitution” and rhetorically asked, “What objects will not this 
expression extend to?”170 Mason argued that “the general description 
of the Judiciary involves the most extensive jurisdiction. Its 
cognizance in all cases arising under the system, and the laws of 
Congress, may be said to be unlimited.”171 Edmund Randolph 
similarly observed in the Virginia Convention that the jurisdiction of 
the federal judiciary “extends to all cases in law and equity arising 
under the Constitution” and proceeded to ask, “What do we mean by 
the words arising under the Constitution? What do they relate to? I 
conceive this to be very ambiguous.”172 Randolph was concerned that 
“the word arising will be carried so far, that it will be made use of to 
aid and extend the Federal jurisdiction.”173 He explained that if he 
“were to propose an amendment on this subject, it would be to limit 
the word arising.”174 He “would not discard it altogether, but define its 
extent. The jurisdiction of the Judiciary in cases arising under the 
system, I should wish to be defined, so as to prevent its being 
 
 168. William Grayson, Speech to the Virginia Convention (June 21, 1788), in 10 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1444, 1446 (Merrill 
Jensen ed., 1976) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. 
 169. Id. at 1446–47. 
 170. George Mason, Speech to the Virginia Convention (June 19, 1788), in 10 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 168, at 
1401, 1401. 
 171. Id. at 1403. 
 172. Edmund Randolph, Speech to the Virginia Convention (June 21, 1788), in 10 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 168, at 
1450, 1452. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 1487. 
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extended unnecessarily . . . .”175 Certain participants in ratification 
debates in other states likewise characterized the words “arising 
under” as indefinite and not amenable to principled limitation.176 The 
claim was not that federal jurisdiction should be unlimited, but that 
the “arising under” language did not limit federal judicial power with 
sufficient certainty. 
Other participants in ratification debates attributed a more 
definite operation to the Arising Under Clause. Some described 
“arising under” jurisdiction to encompass cases involving the 
construction of a federal law. “Brutus,” widely believed to be New 
York judge Robert Yates, explained that “[t]he cases arising under 
the constitution must include such, as bring into question its meaning, 
and will require an explanation of the nature and extent of the powers 
of the different departments under it.”177 He described Article III as 
vesting the federal judiciary “with a power to resolve all questions 
that may arise on any case on the construction of the constitution, 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. See, e.g., Brutus I, N.Y. J., Oct. 18, 1788, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 
supra note 168, at 411, 415–16 (predicting that the federal courts “will be, in themselves, totally 
independent of the states . . . and in the course of human events it is to be expected, that they 
will swallow up all the powers of the courts in the respective states”); Centinel I, INDEP. 
GAZETTEER (Phila., Pa.), Oct. 5, 1787, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 168, 
at 158, 163 (arguing that “[t]he objects of jurisdiction recited above are so numerous, and the 
shades of distinction between civil causes are oftentimes so slight, that it is more than probable 
that the state judicatories would be wholly superseded; for in contests about jurisdiction, the 
federal court, as the most powerful, would ever prevail,” as “[e]very person acquainted with the 
history of the courts in England knows by what ingenious sophisms they have, at different 
periods, extended the sphere of their jurisdiction over objects out of the line of their institution, 
and contrary to their very nature”); Letter from Samuel Osgood to Samuel Adams (Jan. 5, 
1788), in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 168, at 618–19 (observing that “[t]he Judicial 
Power extends to all Cases of Law & Equity arising under the Constitution &ca” and arguing 
that “[t]he Extent of the Judicial Power is therefore, as indefinite & unlimited as Words can 
make it”); cf. James Monroe, Some Observations on the Constitution, May 25, 1788, reprinted in 
9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 168, at 844, 871–72 (stating that “when we observe that 
the cognizance of all cases arising under the constitution and the laws, either of a civil or 
criminal nature, in law or equity, with those other objects which it specifies, even between 
citizens of the same state, are taken from those of each state and absolutely appropriated to the 
courts of the United States, we are led into a view of the very important interests it 
comprehends, and of the extensive scale upon which it operates”). 
 177. Brutus XI, N.Y. J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, 
supra note 152, at 417, 419; see also Centinel XVI, INDEP. GAZETTER (Phila., Pa.), Feb. 26, 
1788, reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 168, at 217, 220 (“The 1st section of 
3d article gives the supreme court cognizance of not only the laws, but of all cases arising under 
the constitution, which empowers this tribunal to decide upon the construction of the 
constitution itself in the last resort.”). 
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either in law or in equity.”178 Later, he observed that “the supreme 
court has the power, in the last resort, to determine all questions that 
may arise in the course of legal discussion, on the meaning and 
construction of the constitution.”179 Luther Martin similarly argued 
that the supreme and inferior courts in which Article III vested “the 
judicial power of the United States” would have an exclusive “right to 
decide upon the laws of the United States, and all questions arising 
upon their construction.”180 
Other participants in ratification debates described “arising 
under” jurisdiction as extending not only to cases calling for the 
construction of a federal law, but more broadly to cases in which 
federal law was determinative of a right or title asserted. Hugh 
Williamson, who represented North Carolina at the Federal 
Convention, explained in Edenton, North Carolina, in November 
1787 that “those cases which are determinable by the general laws of 
the nation, are to be referred to the national Judiciary.”181 He 
described such cases as “those which naturally arise from the 
constitutional laws of Congress.”182 In The Federalist No. 80, Hamilton 
explained that “[i]t seems scarcely to admit of controversy that the 
judiciary authority of the union ought to extend to . . . causes . . . 
 
 178. Brutus XI, N.Y. J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, 
supra note 152, at 417, 419 (emphasis added). 
 179. Brutus XII, N.Y. J., Feb. 7, 1788, reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 
168, at 72, 73 (emphasis added). 
 180. Luther Martin, Information to the General Assembly of the State of Maryland, reprinted 
in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 152, at 27, 57 (emphasis added). The 
“Federal Farmer” appears to have used the phrase “arising upon” or “arising on” in this same 
sense in arguing that the federal courts should not hear cases “arising upon” the laws of the 
state. See Letter from the Federal Farmer No. 3 (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 152, at 234, 243 (“There are some powers proposed to be lodged 
in the general government in the judicial department, I think very unnecessarily, I mean powers 
respecting questions arising upon the internal laws of the respective states. It is proper the 
federal judiciary should have powers co-extensive with the federal legislature—that is, the 
power of deciding finally on the laws of the union.”) (emphasis added). 
It is at least worth noting that these uses of “arising [up]on” to describe “arising under” 
jurisdiction comported with how English courts described questions as “arising [up]on” legal 
instruments with unsettled meanings. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 181. Hugh Williamson, Speech at Edenton, North Carolina (Nov. 8, 1787), in 2 THE 
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, 
AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 227, 230 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 
1993) [hereinafter THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION]. 
 182. Id. at 229 (emphasis added). 
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which arise out of the laws of the United States, passed in pursuance 
of their just and constitutional powers of legislation.”183 
Some writers described these two understandings of “cases 
arising under” federal law—cases involving (1) the interpretation of 
or (2) the enforcement of a federal law—to be of a piece. The 
“Federal Farmer,” commonly believed to be Richard Henry Lee, 
explained that officers of “the judicial courts . . . have it in charge, 
faithfully to decide upon, and execute the laws, in judicial cases.”184 
Luther Martin believed that federal courts would “have a right to 
decide upon the laws of the United States, and all questions arising 
upon their construction,” as well as a right “in a judicial manner to 
carry those laws into execution.”185 
Several participants in ratification debates argued that the 
judicial power of the United States over cases “arising under” federal 
law was commensurate with the legislative power of Congress.186 In so 
arguing, they generally stressed that the courts should have power to 
enforce federal law regardless of whether its meaning was in dispute. 
In the Virginia ratifying convention, John Marshall rejected the claim 
that “arising under” jurisdiction was without meaningful limit: 
 
 183. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 534 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) 
(emphasis added). 
 184. Letter from the Federal Farmer No. 15 (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 152, at 315, 315 (emphasis added). 
 185. Luther Martin, Information to the General Assembly of the State of Maryland, reprinted 
in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 152, at 27, 69. 
 186. E.g., Brutus XIII, N.Y. J., Feb. 21, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 152, at 428, 428 (“For, I conceive that the judicial power should be 
commensurate with the legislative. Or, in other words, the supreme court should have authority 
to determine questions arising under the laws of the union.”); A Landholder V, Conn. Courant, 
Dec. 3, 1787, reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 168, at 483, 483 (“Their courts 
are not to intermeddle with your internal policy and will have cognizance only of those subjects 
which are placed under the control of a national legislature.”); Letter from Samuel Holden 
Parsons to William Cushing (Jan. 11, 1788), reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 
168, at 569, 572 (“[T]he judicial powers of every state must be coextensive with the legislative—
and I cannot find that the legislative powers proposed in this Constitution are extended to any 
objects in which the nation are not immediately or mediately concerned.”); see also 1 ST. 
GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE 
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 419 (1803) (“The judicial power of the United States 
extends to all cases arising under the laws of the United States . . . now as the subjects upon 
which congress have the power to legislate, are all specially enumerated, so the judicial 
authority, under this clause, is limited to the same subjects as congress have power to legislate 
upon.”). 
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Has the Government of the United States power to make laws on 
every subject?—Does he understand it so?—Can they make laws 
affecting the mode of transferring property, or contracts, or claims 
between citizens of the same State? Can they go beyond the 
delegated powers? If they were to make a law not warranted by any 
of the powers enumerated, it would be considered by the Judges as 
an infringement of the Constitution which they are to guard:—They 
would not consider such a law as coming under their jurisdiction.—
They would declare it void.187 
In this argument, Marshall apparently presumed that a case could 
“arise under” the Constitution if a congressional statute conflicted 
with it, even if there was no dispute over the meaning of the statute or 
Constitution.188 
Madison likewise observed that “[w]ith respect to the laws of the 
Union, it is so necessary and expedient that the Judicial power should 
correspond with the Legislative, that it has not been objected to.”189 
“That causes of a federal nature will arise,” he explained, “will be 
obvious to every Gentleman, who will recollect that the States are 
laid under restrictions; and that the rights of the Union are secured by 
those restrictions.”190 In these passages, Madison appears to have 
advocated a need for federal courts to ensure the supremacy of 
federal law regardless of whether in a particular case the meaning of 
that law was in dispute. That said, Madison not only identified a need 
for federal courts to enforce the laws of the Union, but emphasized a 
need for them to “explicate” them as well: “It may be no misfortune 
that in organizing any Government, the explication of its authority 
should be left to any of its co-ordinate branches.”191 
Other statements in ratification debates regarding Article III 
“arising under” jurisdiction provide little insight into its understood 
meaning. Some participants described Article III as giving the federal 
 
 187. John Marshall, Speech to the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 1 THE PAPERS OF 
JOHN MARSHALL 275, 276–77 (Herbert A. Johnson et al. eds., 1974). 
 188. Hamilton made a similar argument in The Federalist No. 80. He gave the following as 
an example of a case “arising under the constitution” of the United States: “Should paper 
money, notwithstanding [the Constitution’s prohibition against states emitting it], be emitted, 
the controversies concerning it would be cases arising upon the constitution, and not upon the 
laws of the United States, in the ordinary signification of the terms.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 183, at 539. 
 189. Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), reprinted in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra 
note 168, at 1412, 1413 (remarks of James Madison). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
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judiciary jurisdiction over “federal causes” or “national causes.”192 A 
federal or national cause could be one that bears any of a number of 
relationships to federal law or institutions: one that a federal statute 
creates, one that federal law otherwise governs, one that implicates a 
disputed question of federal law, or one in which the federal 
government has some other interest. 
Statements that Article III “arising under” jurisdiction extended 
to federal “objects” or “concerns” likewise did not meaningfully 
describe a category of cases that “arising under” jurisdiction would 
encompass.193 James Monroe, in his Observations on the Constitution, 
explained that because the judiciary “forms the branch of a national 
government, so it should contemplate national objects only.”194 As for 
what national objects were in the contemplation of a federal court, 
Monroe simply paraphrased the language of Article III: “Whatever 
cases might arise under the constitution, the laws of the legislature, 
and the acts of the Executive in conformity thereto, (however trifling 
or important the interests it affected might be) should have their final 
decision from this court.”195 
In sum, those who ascribed any meaningful import to Article III 
“arising under” jurisdiction in the ratification debates described it as 
encompassing cases in which the meaning of a federal law would be 
disputed, and cases in which federal law would be determinative of 
the respective rights or titles of the parties. Of course, these 
categories were not mutually exclusive. Those who described “arising 
under” jurisdiction as extending to cases in which federal law was 
 
 192. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 183, at 547 (“The 
most discerning cannot foresee how far the prevalency of a local spirit may be found to 
disqualify the local tribunals for the jurisdiction of national causes . . . .”); Letter from the 
Federal Farmer No. 3 (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra 
note 152, at 234, 244 (“There can be but one supreme court in which the final jurisdiction will 
centre in all federal causes—except in cases where appeals by law shall not be allowed . . . .”). 
 193. See Marcus II, NORFOK & PORTSMOUTH J., Feb. 27, 1788, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE 
ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 181, at 371, 371 (“In no case but where the Union is in some 
measure concerned, are the Foederal Courts to have any jurisdiction.”); A.B., HAMPSHIRE 
GAZETTE, Jan. 9, 1788, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 168, at 667, 668 
(“With respect to the judicial powers, Brutus says, ‘the powers given to these courts are very 
extensive: their jurisdiction comprehends all civil causes except such as arise between citizens of 
the same state; and it extends to all cases in law and equity, arising under this constitution.’ Very 
true! yet it ought to be attended to, that it extends to none but cases of national and general 
concerns . . . .”). 
 194. James Monroe, Some Observations on the Constitution, May 25, 1788, reprinted in 9 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 168, at 844, 866–67. 
 195. Id. 
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determinative of the parties’ rights and titles necessarily 
contemplated cases in which there was a dispute over the meaning of 
governing federal law. And those who described “arising under” 
jurisdiction as extending to cases in which governing federal law was 
in dispute may have been highlighting an important instance of 
“arising under” jurisdiction, not the exclusive one. They may well 
have understood “arising under” jurisdiction to encompass any case 
in which federal law governed, but stressed the importance of federal 
courts explicating the meaning of federal laws. 
2. The Reasons for “Arising Under” Jurisdiction.  There is 
something to be learned not only from the definitions or illustrations 
of “arising under” jurisdiction that participants in ratification debates 
provided, but also from the reasons that they articulated for the 
existence of federal “arising under” jurisdiction. To understand the 
reasons that participants in ratification debates offered to support a 
federal “arising under” jurisdiction, it is useful to call to mind the 
arguments that the Federalists were trying to refute. As is well 
known, Federalists tried to refute the Anti-Federalist claim that the 
federal government, as the Constitution would establish it, would 
unduly encroach on the domain of state governments. The Anti-
Federalist argument that “arising under” jurisdiction was potentially 
limitless was part of a broader argument that the Constitution would 
vest federal institutions with excessive powers, susceptible to 
overreaching and other forms of abuse. A particular concern of Anti-
Federalists was that Article III would empower distant federal courts 
to exercise jurisdiction over state citizens in unduly burdensome 
ways.196 
 
 196. Luther Martin observed, for example, that “[s]hould any question arise between a 
foreign consul and any of the citizens of the United States, however remote from the seat of 
empire, it is to be heard before the judiciary of the general government, and in the first instance 
to be heard in the supreme court, however inconvenient to the parties, and however trifling the 
subject of dispute.” Luther Martin, Information to the General Assembly of the State of 
Maryland, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 152, at 27, 69. 
Similarly, the “Federal Farmer” wrote in 1787 that “with all these moving courts, our citizens, 
from the vast extent of the country must travel very considerable distances from home to find 
the place where justice is to be administered,” which was inconsistent with “good government.” 
Letter from the Federal Farmer No. 2 (Oct. 9, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 152, at 230, 231. Richard Henry Lee (commonly believed to be the 
Federal Farmer) wrote in a letter to Edmund Randolph in 1787 that “power is unnecessarily 
given in the second section of the third article, to call people from their own country in all cases 
of controversy about property between citizens of different states and foreigners, with citizens 
of the United States, to be tried in a distant court where the congress meets.” Letter of Richard 
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Against these claims, participants in ratification debates justified 
“arising under” jurisdiction on grounds that the Constitution should 
enable federal courts, first, to carry federal laws into execution and, 
second, to explicate the meaning of federal laws. These reasons 
comport with the classes of cases, described in the last Section, that 
participants described the Arising Under Clause as encompassing: 
cases in which federal law would provide a governing rule of decision, 
and cases that would call for the explication of a federal law. 
The first proffered reason for arising under jurisdiction was that 
federal courts must be able to enforce federal laws. Federalists and 
Anti-Federalists alike recognized this as a justification for Article 
III’s “arising under” clause. As Edmund Pendleton asked rhetorically 
in the Virginia Convention, “Must not the judicial powers extend to 
enforce the Federal laws . . . ?”197 Perhaps most famously, John 
Marshall argued: 
Is it not necessary that the Federal Courts should have cognizance of 
cases arising under the Constitution, and the laws of the United 
States? What is the service or purpose of a Judiciary, but to execute 
the laws in a peaceable orderly manner, without shedding blood, or 
creating a contest, or availing yourselves of force? If this be the case, 
where can its jurisdiction be more necessary than here? To what 
quarter will you look for protection from an infringement on the 
Constitution, if you will not give power to the Judiciary? There is no 
other body that can afford such a protection.198 
In the words of Brutus, 
This government is a complete system, not only for making, but for 
executing laws. And the courts of law, which will be constituted by 
it, are not only to decide upon the constitution and the laws made in 
pursuance of it, but by officers subordinate to them to execute all 
their decisions.199 
 
Henry Lee to Governor Edmund Randolph (Oct. 16, 1787), reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 152, at 112, 115. 
 197. Edmund Pendleton, Speech to the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 168, at 1412, 1427 (remarks of Edmund Pendleton). 
 198. John Marshall, Speech to the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 1 THE PAPERS OF 
JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 187, at 275, 277. 
 199. Brutus XI, N.Y. J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, 
supra note 152, at 417, 418; see also Noah Webster, An Examination into the Leading Principles 
of the Federal Constitution, by a Citizen of America, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 181, at 129, 152 (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is very 
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Several writers offered more specific reasons why a national 
government should have the ability to enforce national laws through 
its own judiciary. One was to prevent the states from encroaching 
upon the federal government. William Davie argued in the North 
Carolina Convention that “[e]very member will agree that the 
positive regulations ought to be carried into execution, and that the 
negative restrictions ought not to [be] disregarded or violated. 
Without a judiciary, the injunctions of the Constitution may be 
disobeyed, and the positive regulations neglected or contravened.”200 
Similarly, Edmund Randolph argued in the Virginia Convention that 
it was “necessary” that the jurisdiction of federal courts should 
“‘extend to cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, 
and the laws of the United States’” because “[i]f the State Judiciaries 
could make decisions conformable to the laws of their States, in 
derogation to the General Government . . . the Federal Government 
would soon be encroached upon.”201 In the Pennsylvania Convention, 
James Wilson argued that “arising under” jurisdiction would 
specifically prevent the states from undermining the obligations of 
treaties of the United States, such as provisions governing debts owed 
to British subjects.202 
Some writers argued that state judges could not be trusted to 
administer federal laws impartially. In The Federalist No. 81, 
Hamilton argued that federal courts should be empowered to 
judicially enforce federal laws in the exercise of original jurisdiction 
on the ground that “[s]tate judges, holding their offices during 
pleasure, or from year to year, will be too little independent to be 
 
accurately defined and easily understood. It extends to the cases mentioned in the constitution, 
and to the execution of the laws of Congress, respecting commerce, revenue and other general 
concerns.”); A Citizen of New Haven III, Conn. Courant, Jan. 7, 1788, reprinted in 3 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 168, at 524, 527 (“It was thought necessary in order to 
carry into effect the laws of the Union . . . to extend the judicial powers of the United States to 
the enumerated cases . . . .”); A Landholder V, Conn. Courant, Dec. 3, 1787, reprinted in 3 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 168, at 483, 483 (“It is as necessary there should be courts 
of law and executive officers, to carry into effect the laws of the nation, as that there be courts 
and officers to execute the laws made by your state assemblies.”). 
 200. William Davie, Speech to the North Carolina Convention (July 22, 1788), in 4 THE 
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 164, at 155, 156. 
 201. Edmund Randolph, Speech to the Virginia Convention (June 21, 1788), in 10 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 168, at 1440, 1451. 
 202. James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 7, 1787), in 2 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 168, at 512, 517. 
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relied upon for an inflexible execution of the national laws.”203 In the 
North Carolina Convention, Archibald Maclaine argued in a similar 
vein that “[i]t is impossible for any judges, receiving pay from a single 
state, to be impartial in cases where local laws or interests of that 
state clash with the laws of the Union, or the general interests of 
America.”204 
In addition to arguing that federal institutions must be capable of 
enforcing federal laws, participants in ratification debates argued that 
“arising under” jurisdiction would enable federal courts to explicate 
the meaning of federal law and thereby maintain its uniformity. In 
The Federalist No. 22, Hamilton asserted: 
Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their 
true meaning and operation. The treaties of the United States to 
have any force at all, must be considered as part of the law of the 
land. Their true import as far as respects individuals, must, like all 
other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations. To produce 
uniformity in these determinations, they ought to be submitted in 
the last resort, to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL.205 
Hamilton returned to this theme in The Federalist No. 80, in which he 
argued, “If there are such things as political axioms, the propriety of 
the judicial power of a government being co-extensive with its 
legislative, may be ranked among the number. The mere necessity of 
uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws, decides the 
question.”206 
For some writers, these two primary reasons for Article III 
“arising under” jurisdiction—to enable federal courts to enforce 
federal law and to settle the meaning of federal law—were of a piece. 
Brutus, for example, in arguing that federal court jurisdiction in cases 
“arising under the laws of the United States” was proper, asserted 
that “[t]he proper province of the judicial power, in any government, 
is, as I conceive, to declare what is the law of the land” and “[t]o 
 
 203. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 183, at 547. 
 204. Archibald Maclaine, Speech to the North Carolina Convention (July 24, 1788), in 4 
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 164, at 172, 172. 
 205. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 183, at 143. 
 206. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 183, at 535; see also A 
Landholder V, Conn. Courant, Dec. 3, 1787, reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra 
note 168, at 483, 483 (“A perfect uniformity must be observed thro the whole Union, or jealousy 
and unrighteousness will take place; and for a uniformity, one judiciary must pervade the 
whole.”). 
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explain and enforce those laws, which the supreme power or 
legislature may pass.”207 Brutus argued that by having federal courts 
explain and enforce federal laws, “[t]he real effect of this system of 
government, will . . . be brought home to the feelings of the people, 
through the medium of judicial power.”208 
Overall, the ratification debates evidence certain bounds of 
understanding of the operation of Article III “arising under” 
jurisdiction. To be sure, there were some participants who objected to 
Article III on the ground that the Arising Under Clause was 
insufficiently definite to impose a meaningful jurisdictional limitation 
on national courts. They did not argue, however, that federal courts 
should assume an indefinite jurisdiction; rather, they expressed 
concern that national courts would use the text as warrant to 
appropriate for themselves an unwarranted jurisdiction. Those who 
attributed some specific meaning to the Arising Under Clause 
described it as giving federal courts jurisdiction over cases calling for 
the enforcement or explication of federal laws. These descriptive 
meanings comported with the normative reasons participants in 
ratification debates provided for why there should be an “arising 
under” jurisdiction: to enable a federal judiciary both to carry federal 
law into execution and to ensure, at an appropriate level of 
generality, uniformity in its meaning. 
*          *          * 
In a reflective letter to Jefferson in 1823, Madison explained the 
relationship between the Supremacy Clause and the Arising Under 
Clause that prevailed at the Convention. He wrote that “the articles 
declaring that the federal Constitution & laws shall be the supreme 
law of the land, and that the Judicial Power of the U.S. shall extend to 
all cases arising under them” reflected a “prevailing view” at the 
Convention that “the Authority vested in the Judicial Department” 
was “a final resort in relation to the States.”209 Madison quickly 
clarified that this mechanism for ensuring federal supremacy was 
limited relative to his rejected negative. The judicial mechanism, by 
 
 207. Brutus XIII, N.Y. J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, 
supra note 152, at 428, 428 (emphasis added). 
 208. Brutus XI, N.Y. J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, 
supra note 152, at 417, 418. 
 209. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 27, 1823), reprinted in 4 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 115, at 83, 83–84. 
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its nature, would be operative only in “cases resulting to [a federal 
court] in the exercise of its functions.”210 At the Convention, Madison 
noted in similar terms that it was “generally supposed that the 
jurisdiction given was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary 
nature.”211 
Statements such as these reveal why Madison and other 
participants in the framing and ratification of the Constitution would 
have viewed “arising under” jurisdiction as a more limited means of 
enforcing federal supremacy than the congressional negative: the 
judicial function, by its nature, was more limited in regulatory scope 
than the legislative function. In England, in “cases of a judiciary 
nature,” in “the exercise of their functions,” courts followed 
particular rules for determining whether they had power to act in a 
given case. Courts of limited jurisdiction would not exercise 
jurisdiction, as explained in Part I, unless the party invoking the 
court’s jurisdiction demonstrated facts sufficient to satisfy the 
jurisdictional limitations. These rules operated to prevent courts of 
limited jurisdiction from encroaching upon the jurisdiction properly 
belonging to other courts—a concern expressed at the Convention 
with the existence of an inferior federal court system. 
The next Part explains how the national courts would come to 
employ English jurisdictional principles as a means for determining 
when it was appropriate for them, as opposed to state courts, to 
exercise jurisdiction over a case. For early federal courts, these 
principles determined when they were justified in enforcing federal 
law—and thereby fulfilling a key purpose contemplated for them in 
the Constitution’s framing and ratification. 
III.  EARLY AMERICAN JUDICIAL PRACTICE 
In The Federalist, Madison appreciated that ultimately it would 
fall upon federal courts to render Article III “arising under” 
jurisdiction operational in practice. Recognizing the difficulties the 
English legal system experienced through the “ages” in delineating 
the jurisdiction of various courts, he anticipated that the jurisdictional 
provisions of Article III would “be liquidated and ascertained by a 
series of particular discussions and adjudications.”212 
 
 210. Id. 
 211. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 115, at 430. 
 212. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 235–37 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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Few federal court cases decided in the first three decades 
following ratification specifically addressed Article III “arising 
under” jurisdiction. This may stem in part from the fact that Congress 
refrained from giving the Supreme Court or inferior federal courts a 
general “arising under” jurisdiction for eighty-six years after 
ratification. The first Congress authorized the Supreme Court to 
review state court judgments only to the extent that they denied the 
assertion of a federal right.213 Though in 1801 the outgoing Federalist 
Congress gave federal circuit courts “cognizance . . . of all cases in law 
or equity, arising under the constitution and laws of the United 
States,”214 the Jeffersonian Republican Congress repealed that grant 
in 1802 (along with other measures outgoing Federalists had enacted 
to strengthen the Federalist judiciary).215 Congress did not again 
confer jurisdiction on federal courts to hear cases “arising under” 
federal law until 1875.216 
In the first decades following ratification, Congress did give 
inferior federal courts jurisdiction over particular categories of cases 
“arising under” federal law. These categories generally included 
actions for remedies that Congress created and actions that by 
definition federal law primarily would govern.217 It was not until 
Osborn v. United States, decided in 1824, that the Court would 
 
 213. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85 (“[A] final judgment or decree in any 
suit, in the highest court of law or equity of a state . . . where is drawn in question the validity of 
a statute, or an authority exercised under the United States, on the grounds of their being 
repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States . . . may be re-examined and 
reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States.”). 
 214. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 2, 2 Stat. 89, 92. 
 215. Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132. 
 216. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. This enactment was the precursor to 
the federal question jurisdiction codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). 
 217. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, § 1, 3 Stat. 481 (providing that circuit courts have 
original jurisdiction over all actions at law or in equity “arising under any law of the United 
States, granting or confirming to authors or inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings, inventions, and discoveries”); Act of May 10, 1800, ch. 51, § 5, 2 Stat. 70, 71 (providing 
“[t]hat the district and circuit courts of the United States shall have cognizance of all acts and 
offences against the prohibitions” the act provided against the slave trade); Act of Feb. 21, 1793, 
ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (providing that circuit courts may hear treble damage actions for 
patent infringement); Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 122 (providing that district courts 
may hear actions for mitigation of remissions of fines, penalties, or forfeitures imposed under 
laws of the United States); Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (providing that 
district courts may hear actions against patentees for surreptitiously obtaining patents); Act of 
Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (providing that district courts may hear “all suits for 
penalties and forfeitures incurred, under the laws of the United States”). 
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address the constitutionality of one of these specific grants under the 
Arising Under Clause.218 
Courts struggled primarily in the first decades following 
ratification with determining whether cases fell within the “party 
character” grants of Article III. Article III extends the judicial power 
to “Controversies . . . between citizens of different States,” or 
“between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens 
or Subjects.”219 The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided inferior federal 
courts with jurisdiction over controversies “between a citizen of the 
State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State” when 
the amount in dispute exceeded five hundred dollars.220 It also gave 
circuit courts jurisdiction of civil suits to which an alien was a party 
when more than five hundred dollars was in dispute.221 A defendant in 
either kind of action could file a petition to remove it to federal court 
if the plaintiff originally filed it in state court.222 
This Part explains how, following ratification, courts determined 
whether cases fell within the jurisdictional grants of Article III. In 
several cases, courts invoked the principles of English law by which 
courts of limited jurisdiction determined their jurisdiction. Most 
notably, in Osborn v. United States, the Marshall Court implicitly 
invoked these principles to provide a description of Article III 
“arising under” jurisdiction that endures as an authoritative, if widely 
mischaracterized, one. 
A. Original Jurisdiction 
In several cases, federal and state courts invoked the distinction 
between “general” and “limited” jurisdiction in determining the 
existence of original federal court jurisdiction under Article III. In 
1793, in Shedden v. Custis,223 the United States Circuit Court for the 
District of Virginia had to determine whether it had jurisdiction based 
on the plaintiff’s status as a subject or citizen of a foreign state. Justice 
James Iredell (riding circuit), determined that the court lacked 
jurisdiction: 
 
 218. Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
 219. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 220. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 79. 
 223. Shedden v. Custis, 21 F. Cas. 1218 (C.C.D. Va. 1793) (No. 12,736). 
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The jurisdiction of the court is limited to particular persons; and, 
therefore, must be averred. For the difference has been rightly taken 
by the defendant’s counsel, between courts of limited and those of 
general jurisdiction. In the latter, exceptions to the jurisdiction must 
be pleaded; but in the former the defendant is not bound to plead it, 
for the plaintiff must entitle himself to sue there.224 
Chief Justice of the United States John Jay (also riding circuit) agreed 
with Justice Iredell. He explained that regardless of whether a court 
was assuming “jurisdiction over the subject-matter” or “over the 
person,” the plaintiff had to aver in the declaration facts sufficient to 
show that the court had jurisdiction.225 Indeed, he argued that it was 
more important that federal courts observe English rules of practice 
in this regard than that English courts observe them because of the 
federalist system that the Constitution established: 
The English practice has been rightly stated by the defendant’s 
counsel, and those rules are more necessary to be observed here 
than there, on account of a difference of the general and state 
governments, which should be kept separate, and each left to do the 
business properly belonging to it.226 
By requiring that facts necessary to support jurisdiction appear on the 
record, the court would “not exceed its limits, and try causes not 
within its jurisdiction.”227 
Five years later, the Supreme Court invoked the same principles 
in determining whether a circuit court properly heard a case on the 
ground that the plaintiff and the defendant were citizens of different 
states. In 1798, in Bingham v. Cabot,228 Attorney General Charles Lee 
 
 224. Id. at 1219. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. Interestingly, Michael Collins has identified a “tension between common-law 
procedures for raising jurisdictional objections in the federal courts and the notion of limited 
subject matter jurisdiction.” Michael Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming Dec. 2007) (manuscript at 1829, 1832, on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
Specifically, he explains how early federal courts’ reliance on common-law procedures rendered 
them capable of exercising subject-matter jurisdiction when the plaintiff had pleaded but not 
factually established it, or the defendant had waived an objection to it. Accordingly, he 
concludes, “The Federal Rules’ provision that jurisdictional objections in the district courts 
could be made at any time and by any means turns out to have been more of a culmination of a 
longer, historically determined process than a reaffirmation of long-established 
understandings.” Id. (manuscript at 1834). 
 228. Bingham v. Cabot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 382 (1798). 
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argued “that there was not a sufficient allegation on the record, of the 
citizenship of the parties, to sustain the jurisdiction of the Circuit 
Court, which is a limited jurisdiction.”229 Citing the English precedent 
Lord Coningsby’s Case,230 Lee argued that “[w]herever there is a 
limited jurisdiction, the facts that bring the suit within the jurisdiction 
must appear on the record.”231 The Supreme Court agreed with Lee. 
As Alexander Dallas reported the case, 
The Court were clearly of opinion, that it was necessary to set forth 
the citizenship (or alienage, where a foreigner was concerned) of the 
respective parties, in order to bring the case within the jurisdiction 
of the Circuit Court; and that the record, in the present case, was in 
that respect defective.232 
Dallas reported, additionally, that “[t]his cause and many others, in 
the same predicament, were, accordingly, struck off the docket.”233 
The Supreme Court invoked the same principles of English 
practice the following year in Turner v. Bank of North-America.234 In 
the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress enacted that no district or circuit 
court was to “have cognizance of any suit to recover the contents of 
any promissory note or other chose in action in favour of any 
assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court . . . if 
no assignment had been made, except in cases of foreign bills of 
exchange.”235 The purpose of the “assignee clause” was to prevent 
individuals from contriving federal jurisdiction by assigning their 
rights. The issue in Turner was whether the assignee of a promissory 
note, who brought suit against the payor in federal court based on 
diversity of citizenship, had to aver the diversity of the original parties 
to the note for the court to have jurisdiction. 
 
 229. Id. at 383. 
 230. Lord Coningsby’s Case, (1712) 88 Eng. Rep. 388 (Ch.). The report of Bingham v. Cabot 
cites the original report of Lord Coningsby’s Case, “9 Mod. 95.” Bingham, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 
383. 
 231. Bingham, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 383. In Lord Coningsby’s Case, the judges had “all 
agreed,” in determining whether a case was within the jurisdiction of the Dutchy Court, “that 
the dutchy was a circumscribed jurisdiction, and that in all such jurisdictions, the plaintiff in his 
bill or declaration ought to shew, that the cause did arise within the jurisdiction.” Lord 
Coningsby’s Case, 88 Eng. Rep. at 338. 
 232. Bingham, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 383–84. 
 233. Id. at 384. 
 234. Turner v. Bank of North-America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 9–10 (1799). 
 235. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79. 
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Counsel for the parties debated whether, for purposes of 
applying rules of English practice, circuits courts should be 
considered courts of general or limited jurisdiction. Jared Ingersoll 
deemed them courts of limited jurisdiction. He argued that Congress 
enacted the “assignee clause” because it “knew, that the English 
courts had amplified their jurisdiction, through the medium of legal 
fictions” and foresaw “that by the means of a colourable assignment 
to an alien, or to the citizen of another state, every controversy arising 
upon negotiable paper, might be drawn into the federal courts.”236 
Accordingly, he contended, “the original character of the debt is 
declared to be the exclusive test of jurisdiction, in an action to recover 
it.”237 Citing Lord Coningsby’s Case, Ingersoll argued that the plaintiff 
had to aver specific facts satisfying this test for a federal court to 
exercise jurisdiction over the case. In his words, as reported, “a court 
of special jurisdiction cannot take cognizance of the suit, unless the 
case judicially appears by the record to be within its jurisdiction.”238 
Opposing counsel, William Rawle, did not “controvert the general 
proposition, that where a suit is brought before an inferior Court, the 
circumstances that gave it jurisdiction, must be set forth on the 
record.”239 He argued, rather, that a United States circuit court is not 
an inferior court or otherwise a court of limited jurisdiction, but “a 
court of general jurisdiction, having some cases expressly excepted 
from its cognizance.”240 He compared the circuit court “to the King’s 
Bench in England, from whose general jurisdiction is excepted the 
cognizance of cases, belonging to the counties palatine.”241 As to 
courts of general jurisdiction, he concluded, “it is sufficient, if it 
appears to the appellate authority, that, from the subject-matter, the 
court below might have jurisdiction.”242 
Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth, in his opinion for the Court, 
characterized circuit courts as courts of “limited jurisdiction” and 
subjected them to common law rules of practice governing when such 
courts may exercise jurisdiction. Specifically, he explained that a 
circuit court 
 
 236. Turner, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 9. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 9–10. 
 240. Id. at 10. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
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is of limited jurisdiction: and has cognisance, not of cases generally, 
but only of a few specially circumstanced, amounting to a small 
proportion of the cases which an unlimited jurisdiction would 
embrace. And the fair presumption is (not as with regard to a court 
of general jurisdiction, that a cause is within its jurisdiction unless 
the contrary appears, but rather) that a cause is without its 
jurisdiction, until the contrary appears.243 
The Court proceeded to reverse the judgment of the circuit court on 
the ground that the plaintiff’s averments were insufficient to show 
jurisdiction.244 Courts applied the same principles to petitions for 
removal of cases from state to federal court.245 
In each of these cases, the court invoked principles of English 
law to determine federal jurisdiction under Article III. By deeming 
themselves courts of “limited” jurisdiction, federal courts subjected 
themselves to principles that in application limited the extent to 
which they would exercise jurisdiction otherwise belonging to state 
courts. 
It is worth noting that each of these cases was a civil case. In the 
first decades following ratification, a famous debate ensued regarding 
whether federal courts, absent congressional action, could exercise 
jurisdiction (necessarily “arising under” jurisdiction in most 
instances) over common law crimes against the United States. In 
1812, in United States v. Hudson & Goodwin,246 the Supreme Court 
held that courts of the United States cannot “exercise a common law 
jurisdiction in criminal causes,”247 mooting (once the principle of 
Hudson was generally recognized) the question whether such a 
 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id.; see also Martin v. Taylor, 16 F. Cas. 906, 906 (Washington, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. 
Pa. 1803) (No. 9166) (“The declaration claims more than 500 dollars; and by decisions in the 
supreme court, the amount of the plaintiff’s claim laid in the declaration, furnishes the rule for 
testing the jurisdiction of the federal courts.”). 
 245. In Brown v. Crippen, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 173 (1809), for example, a defendant 
petitioned to remove a case from a county court to federal court on the ground that he was sued 
by a citizen of another state on a dispute exceeding five hundred dollars. Id. at 178. The county 
court refused to permit removal for the stated reason, inter alia, that the defendant did not show 
he was a citizen of a different state than the plaintiff. Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia 
reversed, determining that the defendant’s showing that he was a citizen of another state was 
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the federal removal statute. “The removal of the cause 
in such a case is a matter of right which ought not to be refused to any defendant, who makes 
out his case, and complies with the terms of the law.” Id. 
 246. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). 
 247. Id. at 32. 
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jurisdiction would have qualified as Article III “arising under” 
jurisdiction. Notably, however, in the debate that preceded Hudson, 
proponents of federal jurisdiction over common law crimes did not 
see themselves as necessarily rejecting the jurisdictional strictures of 
English law in defining the jurisdiction of federal courts. 
The attorneys and judges involved in United States v. Worrall 248 
articulated the various points of contention regarding whether a 
common law criminal case could be one “arising under” federal law 
for purposes of Article III.249 The question in Worrall was whether a 
federal circuit court had jurisdiction to hear an indictment for the 
common law offense of attempting to bribe a federal officer. 
Alexander Dallas argued to the court that the offense did not “arise 
under the Constitution, or the laws of the United States” because “[a] 
case arising under a law, must mean a case depending on the 
exposition of a law, in respect to something which the law prohibits, 
or enjoins.”250 As neither the Constitution nor an act of Congress 
prohibited the act underlying the indictment, a circuit court could not 
constitutionally take cognizance of the indictment. Justice Samuel 
Chase agreed: “the United States, as a Federal government, have no 
common law; and, consequently, no indictment can be maintained in 
their Courts, for offences merely at the common law.”251 Judge 
Richard Peters, however, disagreed: “Whenever an offence aims at 
the subversion of any Federal institution, or at the corruption of its 
public officers, it is an offence against the well-being of the United 
States; from its very nature, it is cognizable under their authority.”252 
Under English law, it had to be laid in every indictment that an 
offense was “against the king’s peace, or his crown and dignity.”253 In 
accordance with this principle, it was laid in indictments for common 
law offenses against the United States before Hudson that the offense 
was “against the peace and dignity of the United States.”254 
The point is that those who argued in the first two decades 
following ratification that federal courts could hear “federal common 
law crimes” absent congressional action would establish “arising 
 
 248. United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798). 
 249. See id. at 389. 
 250. Id. at 390. 
 251. Id. at 394. 
 252. Id. at 395. 
 253. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *258. 
 254. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 386. 
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under” jurisdiction in a way akin to how federal courts determined 
Article III jurisdiction in civil cases: (1) the indictment alleged an 
offense against the United States, (2) the offense was a violation of a 
common law of the United States, and, thus, (3) the offense arose 
under a law of the United States. In Hudson, the Court rejected this 
reasoning, primarily on the ground that courts of the United States 
could not assume for themselves a common law criminal jurisdiction. 
But those who espoused the reasoning would not have deemed 
themselves to be espousing a position that contradicted the pleading-
based way in which federal courts ascertained the existence of Article 
III jurisdiction in civil cases. 
B. Appellate Jurisdiction 
This Section turns from early decisions concerning original 
jurisdiction to early decisions concerning appellate “arising under” 
jurisdiction. Before 1824, when it decided Osborn v. United States, the 
Supreme Court did not consider the Arising Under Clause relative to 
the original jurisdiction of Article III courts; rather, it considered the 
clause relative to its appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments. 
To understand how the Court considered “arising under” jurisdiction 
in the appellate context, it is useful to distinguish Supreme Court 
review of federal court judgments from Supreme Court review of 
state court judgments. 
1. Supreme Court Review of Federal Court Judgments.  In a few 
pre-1824 cases, the Supreme Court considered its Article III appellate 
“arising under” jurisdiction relative to state court judgments. In no 
case did it consider whether it properly had “arising under” 
jurisdiction in reviewing a federal court judgment. This may have 
been because the Court did not view the Arising Under Clause as a 
limit upon its appellate jurisdiction once an inferior federal court 
properly assumed jurisdiction of a case. Congress certainly did not 
view the Arising Under Clause—or any other Article III 
jurisdictional grant—to operate as a limitation on the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction once an inferior federal court properly 
assumed jurisdiction over a case. The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the 
Supreme Court jurisdiction to review final judgments or decrees of 
the federal circuit courts on writ of error if “the matter in dispute 
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exceeds the sum or value of fifty dollars, exclusive of costs.”255 The 
“matter in dispute” limitation was the only limitation that Congress 
imposed on the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review the judgments 
of federal circuit courts. Once the Article III judicial power 
“attached” in an inferior federal court, Congress allowed the 
Supreme Court to constitutionally exercise an appellate jurisdiction 
akin to the general jurisdiction that English “superior” courts 
exercised over “inferior” courts.256 
2. Supreme Court Review of State Court Judgments.  In contrast, 
the Supreme Court appears to have treated the jurisdictional 
categories of Article III—in particular the Arising Under Clause—as 
an independent limitation on its appellate jurisdiction to review state 
court judgments, operational at the stage of review. In other words, in 
early decisions, the Court acted as though it could exercise 
jurisdiction over a state court judgment not on the ground that the 
action originally would have qualified as one “arising under” federal 
law, but on the ground that, as of the filing of the appellate 
proceeding, the case was one “arising under” federal law. 
In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress gave the Supreme Court 
jurisdiction to review final state court judgments only when was 
“drawn into question” an assertion of federal right against which the 
state court ruled.257 It was not sufficient that federal law operated as a 
rule of decision in the state court; rather, for the Supreme Court to 
have jurisdiction, a federal right had to be “drawn into question” in 
the appellate proceeding.258 This does not prove, of course, that all 
 
 255. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 84. 
 256. In Wilson v. Daniel, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 401 (1798), the Supreme Court addressed whether, 
in ascertaining whether the eighteen hundred dollar matter-in-dispute requirement was fulfilled, 
it should look to the amount in dispute at the time the original action was instituted, or the 
amount in dispute at the time the judgment in the original action was given. Id. at 404–05. It is 
worth noting that in the course of its opinion, the Court did not suggest the existence of any 
limitation—other than the matter-in-dispute limitation that Congress imposed—on its 
jurisdiction to review inferior federal court judgments. See id. at 401–08. 
 257. The Act provided that a final judgment in a state’s highest court, in a suit “where is 
drawn in question the construction of any clause of . . . a treaty . . . and the decision is against 
the . . . right . . . claimed . . . under such clause of the . . . treaty . . . may be re-examined and 
reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States.” Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,  
§ 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–86. 
 258. The Act specified that “no other error shall be assigned or regarded as a ground of 
reversal in any such case as aforesaid, than such as appears on the face of the record, and 
immediately respects the before mentioned questions of validity or construction of the said 
constitution, treaties, statutes, commissions, or authorities in dispute.” Id. at 86. 
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members of Congress necessarily believed that they only could allow 
the Supreme Court to exercise jurisdiction when a federal law would 
prove determinative of the appellate proceeding. The statute they 
enacted, however, comports with such a view, a view that the 
Marshall Court would come to espouse. 
In determining its jurisdiction to review state court judgments, 
the Supreme Court required a party seeking review to demonstrate 
that the case was one “arising under” federal law for purposes of 
Article III. In 1809, in Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee,259 the Supreme 
Court addressed whether it had appellate jurisdiction over a state 
court judgment on the ground that the case was one “arising under” a 
treaty of the United States.260 The facts of the case are complicated, 
but important to understanding the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall. 
Jonathan Scarth, a British subject resident in England, held a 
mortgage upon a tract of land in Maryland.261 In 1732, Littleton 
Waters obtained a judgment against the land based on a debt that 
Scarth owed to him.262 Waters proceed to assign his right in the land to 
a company, under the title of which Owings claimed an interest in the 
land. Pursuant to his claimed interest, Owings occupied the land.263 
Later, the State of Maryland gave Norwood a patent (evidence that 
Norwood held title) in part of the land that Owings was occupying. 
Norwood brought an action of ejectment against Owings.264 As the 
case is reported, Owings claimed, among other things, that the Treaty 
of Paris protected Scarth’s mortgage from confiscation by the State.265 
The treaty provided in relevant part that “it is agreed that all persons 
who have any interest in confiscated lands, either by debts, marriage 
settlements, or otherwise, shall meet with no lawful impediment in 
the prosecution of their just rights.”266 The General Court of 
Maryland held that the time for payment of money under the 
mortgage had expired and that Scarth’s heirs therefore held a 
complete legal estate liable to confiscation.267 The court concluded 
 
 259. Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344 (1809). 
 260. Id. at 347–50. 
 261. Id. at 344. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 344–45. 
 266. Id. at 345 (quoting Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 5, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 
Stat. 80, 83 (emphasis in Owings)). 
 267. Owings, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 345. 
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that “the British treaty cannot operate to affect the plaintiff’s right to 
recover in this ejectment,” and the Court of Appeals affirmed.268 
Owings sued out a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United 
States under section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.269 
In a brief opinion, Chief Justice Marshall stated the jurisdictional 
question as “[w]hether the present case be a case arising under a 
treaty, within the meaning of the Constitution.”270 Upon this question, 
the Court had “no doubt”: 
The 25th section of the judiciary act must be restrained by the 
constitution, the words of which are, “all cases arising under 
treaties.” The plaintiff in error does not contend that his right grows 
out of the treaty. Whether it is an obstacle to the plaintiff’s recovery 
is a question exclusively for the decision of the courts of Maryland.271 
The day after the Court rendered this decision, Chief Justice Marshall 
further explained the decision in response to what he believed to be a 
misunderstanding of it by Owing’s counsel: 
The reason for inserting that clause [“arising under . . . treaties”] in 
the constitution was, that all persons who have real claims under a 
treaty should have their causes decided by the national tribunals. It 
was to avoid the apprehension as well as the danger of state 
prejudices. The words of the constitution are, “cases arising under 
treaties.” Each treaty stipulates something respecting the citizens of 
the two nations, and gives them rights. Whenever a right grows out 
of, or is protected by, a treaty, it is sanctioned against all the laws 
and judicial decisions of the states; and whoever may have this right, 
it is to be protected. But if the person’s title is not affected by the 
treaty, if he claims nothing under a treaty, his title cannot be 
protected by the treaty. If Scarth or his heirs had claimed, it would 
have been a case arising under a treaty. But neither the title of 
Scarth, nor of any person claiming under him, can be affected by the 
decision of this cause.272 
In Marshall’s view, for a case to be one arising under federal law 
at the time a writ of error was sought, the plaintiff in error had to 
demonstrate that federal law created or protected the right or title 
 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. at 347 (emphasis added). 
 271. Id. at 347–48. 
 272. Id. at 348. 
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that the plaintiff in error was asserting in the appellate proceeding.273 
When a plaintiff in error made that demonstration, the Supreme 
Court was available to ensure the supremacy of that right against 
conflicting state laws. In this case, a federal treaty neither generated 
nor protected Owings’s title to the land in question. The treaty came 
into play only because state law enabled a defendant in an ejectment 
action to defeat the action by setting up the title of a third person in 
bar of the action.274 In other words, the treaty was relevant only to the 
extent that state law provided that Owings could show that 
Norwood’s claim did not defeat Scarth’s title. The basis of Marshall’s 
opinion appears to have been that a case, as it comes before the 
Supreme Court, is not one “arising under” a federal law unless 
federal law generates or otherwise affects of its own force a right or 
title the petitioner asserts in the appellate proceeding. 
In 1821, in Cohens v. Virginia,275 Chief Justice Marshall again 
addressed what makes a case one “arising under” federal law for 
purposes of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The 
primary issues before the Court in Cohens were whether a writ of 
error lies from the Supreme Court to a state court, and whether the 
Supreme Court may exercise jurisdiction over a case to which a state 
is a party. In addressing these issues, Chief Justice Marshall described 
 
 273. See id. Justice William Johnson made a similar point for the Court in M’Intire v. Wood, 
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813), albeit a statutory case. The question before the Court in that case 
was whether a federal circuit court had power to issue a writ of mandamus to a particular state 
official. In holding that “the power of the Circuit Courts to issue writs of mandamus, is confined 
exclusively to those cases in which it may be necessary to the exercise of their jurisdiction,” 
Justice Johnson explained that “although the judicial power of the United States extends to 
cases arising under the laws of the United States, the legislature have not thought proper to 
delegate the exercise of that power to its Circuit Courts, except in certain specified cases.” Id. at 
506. Rather, “[w]hen questions arise under those laws in the State Courts, and the party who 
claims a right or privilege under them is unsuccessful, an appeal is given to the Supreme Court, 
and this provision the legislature has thought sufficient at present for all the political purposes 
intended to be answered by the clause of the constitution, which relates to this subject.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 274. See Owings, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 347. In Henderson v. Tennessee, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 311 
(1850), the apparently identical issue arose. In Henderson, the Court explained that 
in the language of ejectment law, an outstanding title means a title in a third person, 
under which the tenant in possession does not claim. . . . The right to make this 
defence is not derived from the treaties, nor from any authority exercised under the 
general government. It is given by the laws of the State, which provide that the 
defendant in ejectment may set up title in a stranger in bar of the action. 
Id. at 323. 
 275. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
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what makes a case one “arising under” the Constitution or a federal 
law. 
First, Marshall explained the reasons for Article III “arising 
under” jurisdiction. An “important . . . object” of Article III, he 
explained, “was the preservation of the constitution and laws of the 
United States, so far as they can be preserved by judicial authority; 
and therefore the jurisdiction of the Courts of the Union was 
expressly extended to all cases arising under that constitution and 
those laws.”276 Marshall deemed “arising under” jurisdiction essential 
to counter “attempts which may be made, by a part, against the 
legitimate powers of the whole,” and to ensure “[t]hat the 
constitution, laws, and treaties may [not] receive as many 
constructions as there are States.”277 In short, he argued, as was 
argued in ratification debates, that “arising under” jurisdiction was 
necessary to ensure the proper enforcement and uniformity of federal 
law. Marshall deemed the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
over state courts judgments essential to this design: “The exercise of 
the appellate power over those judgments of the State tribunals which 
may contravene the constitution or laws of the United States, is, we 
believe, essential to the attainment of those objects.”278 
Second, Marshall described what makes a case one “arising 
under” federal law. Marshall acknowledged that the federal judicial 
power to maintain the supremacy of federal law by exercising “arising 
under” jurisdiction was limited (as the Framers recognized relative to 
Madison’s negative): 
[Article III] does not extend the judicial power to every violation of 
the constitution which may possibly take place, but to “a case in law 
or equity,” in which a right, under such law, is asserted in a Court of 
justice. If the question cannot be brought into a Court, then there is 
no case in law or equity, and no jurisdiction is given by the words of 
the article. But if, in any controversy depending in a Court, the 
cause should depend on the validity of such a law, that would be a 
case arising under the constitution, to which the judicial power of 
the United States would extend.279 
 
 276. Id. at 391. 
 277. Id. at 377. 
 278. Id. at 415. 
 279. Id. at 405. 
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Marshall rejected as “too narrow” an understanding that a case 
“arises under” federal law only if “a party comes into the Court to 
demand something conferred on him by the constitution or a law.”280 
Rather, he explained, “A case in law or equity consists of the right of 
the one party, as well as of the other, and may truly be said to arise 
under the constitution or a law of the United States, whenever its 
correct decision depends on the construction of either.”281 This 
explanation is generally consistent with Marshall’s explanation in 
Owings that a case “arises under” a treaty if the treaty generates or 
otherwise affects the right or title asserted before the Court. When 
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, by operation 
of their own force, create or are otherwise determinative of a right 
asserted in a case, that case is one “arising under” that law. 
Regarding the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over 
state court judgments in particular, Marshall suggested that the issues 
determinative of the appeal were the issues determinative of 
jurisdiction. He explained that the Supreme Court was essential to 
maintaining federal supremacy because whether a case is one “arising 
under” federal law may not be apparent in all cases at the outset of 
the action: 
That the constitution or a law of the United States, is involved in a 
case, and makes a part of it, may appear in the progress of a cause, 
in which the Courts of the Union, but for that circumstance, would 
have no jurisdiction, and which of consequence could not originate 
in the Supreme Court.282 
“In such a case,” Marshall explained, the federal judicial power can 
be exercised “only in its appellate form.”283 In rejecting the argument 
that the Supreme Court lacked appellate jurisdiction under Article III 
to review state court judgments, Marshall stated, “The objects of 
appeal, not the tribunals from which it is to be made, are alone 
contemplated.” Each of these statements suggests, in line with 
Owings, that the Supreme Court has appellate “arising under” 
jurisdiction over a state court judgment if it can be shown at the time 
of appeal that federal law is determinative of a right or title asserted 
on appeal. 
 
 280. Id. at 379. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 394. 
 283. Id. 
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C. Osborn v. United States in Historical Context 
Three years after it decided Cohens, the Supreme Court issued 
its most famous opinion on Article III “arising under” jurisdiction—
Osborn v. United States.284 Chief Justice Marshall explained for the 
Court in Osborn that a case arises under federal law when a federal 
question “forms an ingredient of the original cause.”285 Courts and 
scholars have read this holding in potentially limitless fashion, 
understanding Marshall to have conveyed that a case arises under 
federal law if a federal question might possibly arise in it.286 As I have 
argued elsewhere, Marshall’s opinion, most fairly construed, held that 
the case arose under federal law because the plaintiff, to prevail, 
necessarily had to plead and prove a right or title that federal law 
created.287 
In Osborn, the Bank of the United States and certain of its 
officials brought a suit in equity in a federal circuit court for an 
injunction and other relief against certain Ohio officials.288 After the 
Bank filed this suit, the Ohio officials took one hundred thousand 
dollars from the Bank’s office at Chillicothe, Ohio.289 The Bank filed a 
supplemental and amended bill of complaint, and obtained a 
judgment ordering the state officials to give restitution of the one 
hundred thousand dollars.290 In its opinion affirming this judgment, 
the Supreme Court addressed whether this was a case “arising under” 
federal law, such that the circuit court properly assumed jurisdiction 
over it.291 
The Court began its analysis by explaining, as it did in Cohens, 
the reason for Article III “arising under” jurisdiction. “[T]he 
framers,” Marshall wrote, “kept this great political principle in view”: 
that all governments “must possess, within themselves, the means of 
expounding, as well as enforcing, their own laws.”292 To give effect to 
this principle, Marshall explained, the Constitution vested federal 
 
 284. Osborn v. United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
 285. Id. at 823. 
 286. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
 287. See Bellia, supra note 10, at 800–12. 
 288. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 739–41. 
 289. Id. at 741. 
 290. Id. at 743–44. 
 291. Id. at 819. 
 292. Id. 
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courts with “arising under” jurisdiction.293 This explanation comports 
with the account of the framing and ratification of Article III “arising 
under” jurisdiction that Part II describes. 
In this case, an act of Congress had conferred on the Bank 
various corporate capacities, including the ability to sue and be sued 
in federal circuit courts.294 The Court had to decide whether the suit in 
equity that the Bank brought was a case “arising under” federal law 
given that “general principles” of law would determine the Bank’s 
right to relief.295 The only federal law that could provide the basis for 
“arising under” jurisdiction was the federal statute giving the Bank its 
various capacities. The Court held that the case did arise under this 
statute because it formed “an ingredient of the original cause.”296 
At the time the Court decided Osborn, a plaintiff had a cause of 
action only upon showing that a set of legal determinants providing a 
right to relief under a particular form of proceeding resolved 
themselves in the plaintiff’s favor.297 Marshall not only understood 
that a plaintiff had to seek relief through a particular form of 
proceeding to bring an action, but also framed the question whether a 
case arose under federal law within the context of the rights or titles 
that legal and equitable modes of proceeding required a plaintiff to 
aver. The judicial power, Marshall explained, “is capable of acting 
only when the subject is submitted to it by a party who asserts his 
rights in the form prescribed by law. It then becomes a case.”298 In light 
of this background, Marshall explained that whether a case arises 
under federal law depends upon the requirements that a plaintiff 
must satisfy to have a cause of action under a particular form of 
proceeding: a case arises under federal law if “the title or right set up 
by the party, may be defeated by one construction of the constitution 
or law of the United States, and sustained by the opposite 
construction.”299 When a plaintiff properly set up such a right or title, 
 
 293. Id. 
 294. See id. at 825. The Act empowered the Bank “to sue and be sued, plead and be 
impleaded, answer and be answered, defend, and be defended, in all state courts having 
competent jurisdiction, and in any circuit court of the United States.” Act of Apr. 10, 1816,  
ch. 44, § 7, 3 Stat. 266, 269. 
 295. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 819–25 (1824). 
 296. Id. at 823. 
 297. See Bellia, supra note 10, at 782–801 (explaining the context in which Osborn was 
decided). 
 298. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 819 (emphasis added). 
 299. Id. at 822 (emphasis added). 
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Marshall explained, the case arose under federal law because a 
federal question “forms an ingredient of the original cause.”300 
The reason that the Bank’s suit in Osborn was one “arising 
under” federal law was that the federal statute conferring on the 
Bank its capacities was an ingredient of any action that the Bank 
might bring. In an action at law or a suit in equity, the plaintiff’s 
statement of the cause of action in the declaration or bill had to show 
a right or title to the thing demanded. Specifically, in a suit in equity, 
such as Osborn, the bill had to state “the right, title, or claim of the 
plaintiff”; “the injury or grievance, of which he complains”; and “the 
relief, which he asks of the Court.”301 Indeed, the plaintiff had to state 
in the bill all facts giving rise to the plaintiff’s right or title,302 including 
the plaintiff’s interest in the subject matter or title to maintain the 
suit.303 If the plaintiff failed to allege a fact necessary to make this 
showing, the plaintiff could not later prove it.304 Moreover, if the 
plaintiff failed to allege facts in the bill sufficient to demonstrate a 
right to institute the proceedings, the defendant could demur. To 
bring and prevail in its suit against the Ohio officials, then, the Bank 
had to demonstrate facts establishing its right to the one hundred 
thousand dollars that the Ohio officials had taken from it, regardless 
 
 300. Id. at 823. 
 301. See EDMUND ROBERT DANIELL, PLEADING AND PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT OF 
CHANCERY 370 (2d ed. 1851) (“In the first place, it is to be observed that every bill must show 
clearly that the plaintiff has a right to the thing demanded, or such an interest in the subject-
matter as gives him a right to institute a suit concerning it.”); 2 HENRY MADDOCK, A TREATISE 
ON THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 168 (2d Am. ed. 1822) 
(“Whatever is essential to the rights of the Plaintiff, and is necessarily within his knowledge, 
ought to be alleged positively, and with precision . . . .”); HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE 
ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS 321 (1824) (“When, in pleading, any right 
or authority is set up in respect of property personal or real, some title to that property must, of 
course be alleged in the party, or in some other person from whom he derives his authority.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 302. See DANIELL, supra note 301, at 638 (“[A]ll preliminary acts necessary to complete the 
plaintiff’s title must be shown . . . .”). 
 303. See id. at 371 (“[I]f it is not shown by the bill that the party suing has an interest in the 
subject-matter, and a proper title to institute a suit concerning it, the defendant may 
demur . . . .”); JOSEPH STORY, Progress of Jurisprudence: An Address Delivered Before the 
Members of the Suffolk Bar, in THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 198, 214 
(William W. Story ed., 1852) (“[E]very fact essential to the plaintiff’s title to maintain the Bill, 
and obtain the relief, must be stated in the Bill, otherwise the defect will be fatal.”). 
 304. See DANIELL, supra note 301, at 388 (“Care . . . must be taken in framing the bill that 
every thing which is intended to be proved be stated upon the face of it, otherwise evidence 
cannot be admitted to prove it.”); STORY, supra note 93, § 28, at 24 (“[E]very material fact, to 
which the plaintiff means to offer evidence, ought to be distinctly stated in the premises; for 
otherwise he will not be permitted to offer or require any evidence of such fact.”). 
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of whether the defendants contested them. The federal statute giving 
the Bank its capacities was an essential component—“ingredient,” in 
Marshall’s words—of the showing the plaintiff had to make. The fact 
that the act of Congress incorporating the Bank “bestow[ed] upon the 
being it has made, all the faculties and capacities which that being 
possesses,”305 rendered federal law, in Marshall’s view, a necessary 
ingredient of the Bank’s right or title—an ingredient that the Bank 
had to “set up” to prevail.306 Thus, federal law was an ingredient of 
any cause that the Bank might bring. 
To say in Osborn that federal law was an ingredient of a cause of 
action was only to say that the Bank, as plaintiff, had to establish 
under federal law its capacity to have a right or title to property and a 
right to institute a suit with respect thereto, regardless of whether the 
defendant contested that capacity. Marshall’s ingredient test did not, 
as the Court has subsequently suggested, convey that federal law 
forms an ingredient of the cause of action whenever a case 
theoretically “might call for the application of federal law.”307 This 
mischaracterization finds its roots in Justice William Johnson’s 
Osborn dissent. Justice Johnson argued that the “possibility” that a 
federal question might arise in a case cannot “be a sufficient 
circumstance to bring it within the jurisdiction of the United States 
Courts.”308 “By possibility,” he explained, “a constitutional question 
may be raised in any conceivable suit that may be instituted.”309 But 
Marshall’s opinion did not say, as Johnson characterizes it as saying, 
that a case arises under federal law if a federal question may possibly 
be raised in it. Marshall reasoned that questions of the Bank’s 
capacities, by virtue of the right or title the Bank must show, “exist in 
every possible case.”310 
Osborn is also interesting for what it says about the appellate 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over actions “arising under” 
federal law. The jurisdictional question at issue in Osborn, of course, 
was whether a circuit court of the United States could exercise 
original jurisdiction over the action the Bank brought. Having found 
that the circuit courts of the United States could constitutionally 
 
 305. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 827. 
 306. See id. 
 307. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 492 (1983). 
 308. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 876 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
 309. Id. at 887. 
 310. Id. at 824 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
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exercise jurisdiction, the Court did not consider in a differentiated 
way whether it could exercise appellate jurisdiction in the case. The 
Court’s analysis suggests, in accordance with the general jurisdiction 
Congress gave the Supreme Court to review judgments of inferior 
federal courts, that once original jurisdiction of a cause “attached” in 
an inferior federal court, the Supreme Court could exercise appellate 
jurisdiction over proceedings in the inferior court without having to 
establish an independent basis for its own jurisdiction. 
Moreover, Osborn, read in historical context, appears to 
presume that the Supreme Court should determine its appellate 
jurisdiction to review state court judgments in the same pleading-
based way that an Article III court should determine whether it may 
exercise jurisdiction over an original cause. In a famous passage, 
Marshall explained: 
The constitution establishes the Supreme Court, and defines its 
jurisdiction. It enumerates cases in which its jurisdiction is original 
and exclusive; and then defines that which is appellate, but does not 
insinuate, that in any such case, the power cannot be exercised in its 
original form by Courts of original jurisdiction. It is not insinuated, 
that the judicial power, in cases depending on the character of the 
cause, cannot be exercised in the first instance, in the Courts of the 
Union, but must first be exercised in the tribunals of the State; 
tribunals over which the government of the Union has no adequate 
control, and which may be closed to any claim asserted under a law 
of the United States. 
We perceive, then, no ground on which the proposition can be 
maintained, that Congress is incapable of giving the Circuit Courts 
original jurisdiction, in any case to which the appellate jurisdiction 
extends.311 
Some scholars have read this language to support a seemingly 
boundless reading of Osborn—that Congress may give inferior 
federal courts jurisdiction over any case in which a federal question 
might possibly provide a ground for appellate review in the Supreme 
Court.312 The theory is that if the Supreme Court could exercise “the 
judicial power of the United States” to review a state court judgment 
on the ground that a federal question would be determinative of the 
parties’ rights in the Supreme Court, an inferior federal court could 
 
 311. Id. at 821 (emphasis added). 
 312. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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have exercised the judicial power of the United States over that 
action originally even if the plaintiff did not demonstrate in the initial 
pleading that a federal question would necessarily be determinative 
of the parties’ rights. In other words, an inferior federal court could 
assume “arising under” jurisdiction over any case in which a federal 
question might possibly arise, because, if the question in fact arose, 
the Supreme Court could exercise appellate “arising under” 
jurisdiction; and, in Marshall’s words, inferior federal courts may have 
“original jurisdiction, in any case to which the appellate jurisdiction 
extends.” 
Considered in its historical context, Marshall’s statement does 
not in fact support this theory. In Owings and Cohens, Marshall 
described the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over cases 
“arising under” federal law as extending to cases in which the plaintiff 
in error demonstrated that a federal law was determinative of the 
rights or titles at issue in the appellate proceeding. When Marshall 
said in Osborn that federal courts may have “original jurisdiction, in 
any case to which the appellate jurisdiction extends”—that is, in cases 
in which a party asserts a right or title that “grows out of, or is 
protected by” federal law313—he meant that federal courts may have 
original jurisdiction in any case, like Osborn, in which a party 
demonstrates a right or title that “grows out of, or is protected by” 
federal law. This was the kind of case to which Marshall referred 
when he limited these observations to “cases depending on the 
character of the cause.” Indeed, he explained, the reason that original 
jurisdiction should extend to such cases was that, if it did not, 
words obviously intended to secure to those who claim rights under 
the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, a trial in 
federal court, will be restricted to the insecure remedy of an appeal 
upon an isolated point, after it has received the shape which may be 
given to it by another tribunal.314 
Thus, he immediately explained, “when a question to which the 
judicial power of the Union is extended by the constitution, forms an 
ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give 
the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause.”315 
 
 313. Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 348 (1809). 
 314. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 822–23 (emphasis added). 
 315. Id. at 823 (emphasis added). 
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Only this reading makes sense of Marshall’s statement in Cohens 
that federal courts lack original jurisdiction when a federal law does 
not form a part of the plaintiff’s case as originally filed: “That the 
constitution or a law of the United States, is involved in a case, and 
makes a part of it, may appear in the progress of a cause, in which the 
Courts of the Union, but for that circumstance, would have no 
jurisdiction.”316 “In such a case,” Marshall explained, the federal 
judiciary can exercise its jurisdiction “only in its appellate form.”317 In 
Cohens, Marshall envisioned cases that a federal court could not hear 
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, but that the Supreme Court 
could hear in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The most 
reasonable import of Marshall’s statement in Osborn is that just as 
the Supreme Court may exercise appellate jurisdiction over a case by 
virtue of the fact that a plaintiff in error has asserted a right or title 
that federal law creates or protects, a federal court may exercise 
original jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that a plaintiff has asserted a 
right or title that federal law creates or protects upon a valid showing 
that the right asserted grows out of or is protected by federal law.318 
 
 316. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 394 (1821). 
 317. Id. 
 318. It is worth noting that Osborn is not the only early nineteenth century Supreme Court 
decision that rested, albeit implicitly, upon common-law jurisdictional principles to determine 
whether a federal court could exercise jurisdiction based on the existence of a federal question 
in a case. The 1824 decision in Ex parte Wood & Brundage, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 603 (1824), relied 
on such principles as well. The federal statute establishing the Bank of the United States, as 
interpreted in Osborn, was one of a limited number of early federal statutes giving federal 
courts jurisdiction over particular cases “arising under” federal law. Other statutes giving 
federal courts such jurisdiction related to patents. In 1790, Congress gave district courts limited 
powers to revoke wrongfully obtained patents, see Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 
111, and in 1793 provided that patentees could sue in federal circuit courts for infringement “in 
an action on the case founded on” the act of Congress governing patents. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, 
ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322. In 1800, Congress repealed this provision and provided that a 
patentee could recover for infringement “by action on the case founded on this . . . act, in the 
circuit court of the United States, having jurisdiction thereof.” Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 
Stat. 38. In Wood, the Court relied on English jurisdictional principles in explaining the 
operation of a provision of the 1793 Act. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 606–07. 
The tenth section of the 1793 patent act provided that a party could challenge the validity 
of a patent issued under federal law on the ground that it “was obtained surreptitiously, or upon 
false suggestion” by making a motion to the district court where the patentee resides “within 
three years” after the patent was issued. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318. One issue 
before the Court in Wood was what showing, if any, was necessary to bring a proceeding under 
the 1793 act within the jurisdiction of a district court. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 604–05. In his 
opinion for the Court, Justice Story invoked the distinction between general and limited 
jurisdiction to determine that a plaintiff must establish facts necessary to show jurisdiction in 
initiating the proceeding to invalidate the patent. “The jurisdiction given to the Court,” Story 
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This is not to assert that Osborn articulated a “limited” 
understanding of the Arising Under Clause in any absolute sense. In 
Marshall’s view, the power of the federal judiciary to adjudicate cases 
“arising under” federal law would depend upon the powers of 
Congress to create, protect, or affect the rights of individuals and 
institutions. The greater the regulatory power of Congress, the 
greater would be the scope of constitutional “arising under” 
jurisdiction that Congress may authorize federal courts to exercise. 
And, of course, it was the Marshall Court’s decision in McCulloch v. 
Maryland 319—recognizing that Congress could create the Bank of the 
United States and that states could not tax it320—that provided the 
necessary predicate for its decision in Osborn that the Bank’s case 
properly arose under the act of Congress constituting the Bank. If 
Osborn conveys a “broad” conception of “arising under” jurisdiction, 
it does so only to the extent that the powers of Congress to enact laws 
governing judicially enforceable individual or institutional rights are 
broad. This is consistent with what Ted White has described as the 
“coterminous power theory” prevailing at the time of the American 
Founding.321 As “Brutus” explained it at the time, “[e]very extension 
of the power of the general legislature, as well as of the judicial 
powers, will increase the powers of the courts.”322 
That said, it is one thing for a federal court to exercise 
jurisdiction because Congress has enacted a law determinative of a 
 
explained, “is not general and unlimited, but is confined to cases where the patent was obtained 
surreptitiously, or upon false suggestions; where the patentee resides within the district; and 
where the application is made within three years after the issuing of the patent.” Id. at 606. 
Thus, he continued, “[i]t is . . . certainly necessary, that all these facts, which are indispensable to 
found jurisdiction, should be stated in the motion and accompanying affidavits.” Id. 
Unlike Osborn, Wood did not specifically address whether the proceeding before it was 
one “arising under” federal law for purpose of Article III. It did, however, explain that to bring 
an action under a statute giving federal courts jurisdiction of a particular kind of case “arising 
under” federal law, a plaintiff had to show facts establishing jurisdiction, including the specific 
ingredient that the patentee was not entitled to a patent under federal law. 
 319. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 320. Id. at 435–36. 
 321. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815–
1835, at 122–27 (1988); G. Edward White, Recovering Coterminous Power Theory, 14 NOVA L. 
REV. 155 (1989). Professor White critiqued “the difficulty with Marshall’s argument” as being 
“that it was hard to imagine any case in which Congress, simply by passing a law affecting an 
institution or individual, could be prevented from giving the subject of the legislation a right to 
sue in the federal courts, whatever legal questions were raised by the suit.” WHITE, supra, at 
530. 
 322. Brutus XI, N.Y. J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, 
supra note 152, at 417, 421. 
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right or title that actually is at issue in a case; it is another for a 
federal court to exercise jurisdiction because a federal law might be 
involved in a case. Osborn is “broad” insofar as congressional power 
(influenced and shaped by the Court, as it is) to define and regulate 
legal relations is broad. But Osborn is “narrow” insofar as a federal 
court may not exercise “arising under” jurisdiction absent an actual 
federal law being determinative in a proceeding before it. Under 
Osborn, for a court to constitutionally exercise “arising under” 
jurisdiction, Congress (absent a governing constitutional provision or 
treaty) must actually have enacted a regulation generating or 
protecting a right or title asserted in a case. 
The distinction between a congressional power to give federal 
courts jurisdiction over cases that might possibly turn on federal law 
and a power to give them jurisdiction over cases that in fact turn on a 
question of federal law is not merely formal. Multiple federal 
governmental actors, subject to “procedural” and “political” 
safeguards of federalism, must assent for a federal law to be 
enacted.323 That Congress is desirous and capable of enacting a law 
giving federal courts jurisdiction over cases in which federal law 
possibly might govern does not mean that it is desirous and capable of 
enacting federal law governing the actual transactions or occurrences 
underlying all such lawsuits. A congressional power under the Arising 
Under Clause to give federal courts jurisdiction when a federal law 
might possibly be determinative is not the functional equivalent of a 
congressional power to give federal courts jurisdiction when a federal 
law actually is determinative. The political will and capability to enact 
the former does not necessarily prove the will or capability to enact 
the latter. To be sure, the Marshall Court described an Article III 
“arising under” jurisdiction that is as broad in theory as congressional 
power to generate and protect justiciable legal rights. But it was a 
jurisdiction that was only as broad in practice as the scope of enacted 
congressional regulation generating and protecting justiciable legal 
rights. 
 
 323. See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. 
REV. 1321, 1326 (2001) (“All the procedures established by the Constitution make adoption of 
[federal law] difficult by requiring the participation and assent of multiple actors subject to the 
political safeguards of federalism.”). 
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D. Provisional Summary 
In sum, in the first few decades following ratification, federal 
courts determined whether they had jurisdiction over a particular 
proceeding according to the same principles by which English courts 
of limited jurisdiction determined whether they had jurisdiction. In 
determining whether it was proper for a federal court to exercise 
original jurisdiction, courts examined whether the party seeking 
federal court jurisdiction, originally or by removal, averred sufficient 
facts to show jurisdiction. In the context of “arising under” 
jurisdiction, the question was whether the plaintiff pleaded that its 
right or title grew out of or would necessarily be affected by the 
operation of a federal law. 
Regarding the question of whether it was proper for the Supreme 
Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction, different principles operated 
depending on whether the Supreme Court was reviewing the 
judgment of a federal court or a state court. The first Congress 
appears to have presumed that the Supreme Court stood in the same 
relation to inferior federal courts as the superior courts of England 
stood to inferior English courts: so long as the inferior court properly 
had jurisdiction, the Supreme Court could review its decisions for any 
substantial error in the record determinative of the judgment. On the 
other hand, the Supreme Court seemingly presumed itself (and 
perhaps Congress presumed it as well) to stand as a court of limited 
jurisdiction relative to state courts: for the Court to review a state 
court judgment, it had to appear on the record that a federal law 
would be determinative of the right or title the plaintiff in error was 
asserting in the Supreme Court. 
It would be beyond the scope of this Article to attempt to work 
out all the implications of this analysis for federal court jurisdiction. 
The analysis certainly suggests that “arising under” jurisdiction is 
appropriate when a party initially seeking federal court jurisdiction 
(originally, by removal, or on appeal) demonstrates that the 
Constitution, a federal statute, or a federal treaty is determinative of 
the legal relations upon which the court must pass. Beyond that, an 
analysis of implications would involve, among other things, the level 
of generality at which jurisdictional principles that the Supreme Court 
formulated in the context of common law and equitable pleading 
regimes are legally relevant in light of the transformation of pleading 
rules that has occurred through the course of American history. This 
analysis would have to account for the full scope of congressional 
01__BELLIA.DOC 12/6/2007  8:42:34 AM 
342 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:263 
power to devise a pleading regime designed to determine the 
presence of a federal question in a case (by way of the claim or 
defense) before a court assumes jurisdiction. It also would have to 
account for the legitimacy of nonconventional forms of federal law, 
such as “federal common law,” and their ability to serve as a 
predicate for “arising under” jurisdiction. 
There is one implication that is especially worth identifying, if 
not working out, here. It is that seemingly boundless theories of 
protective jurisdiction should not rest for their legitimacy on the 
stated reasoning of Osborn v. United States, properly understood in 
historical context. The stated reasoning of Osborn, to be sure, stands 
for one species of “protective” jurisdiction (and a potentially “broad” 
one at that): that a plaintiff with a right that federal law creates or 
protects (such as the Bank’s federally created right to hold property, 
namely the money Ohio officials seized from it) may find protection 
of that right in federal court. It does not, however, stand for what 
scholars more commonly denote by “protective jurisdiction”—that, to 
protect “federal interests,” Congress may give federal courts “arising 
under” jurisdiction in cases in which no actual federal law provides a 
rule of decision.324 Osborn, in context, evidences an understanding 
that for a federal court to have “arising under” jurisdiction, an actual 
federal law must be demonstrably determinative of the legal relations 
of the parties that are at issue.325 Indeed, in Cohens, Marshall deemed 
the ingredient test the necessary one by which federal courts were to 
determine their Article III jurisdiction, not merely a sufficient one. In 
Marshall’s words, 
That the constitution or a law of the United States, is involved in a 
case, and makes a part of it, may appear in the progress of a cause, 
in which the Courts of the Union, but for that circumstance, would 
 
 324. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 473 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (“Called ‘protective jurisdiction,’ the suggestion is that in any case for which 
Congress has the constitutional power to prescribe federal rules of decision and thus confer 
‘true’ federal question jurisdiction, it may, without so doing, enact a jurisdictional statute, which 
will provide a federal forum for the application of state statute and decisional law.”). The 
Supreme Court has refrained from adopting such a theory. See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 
137 (1989) (“We have, in the past, not found the need to adopt a theory of ‘protective 
jurisdiction’ to support Art. III ‘arising under’ jurisdiction, and we do not see any need for doing 
so here . . . .” (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 491 n.17 (1983)); 
Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 491 n.17 (“[W]e need not consider petitioner’s alternative argument that 
the Act is constitutional as an aspect of so-called ‘protective jurisdiction.’”). 
 325. Osborn v. United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824). 
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have no jurisdiction, and which of consequence could not originate 
in the Supreme Court.326 
For the Marshall Court, a case did not “arise under” federal law if a 
federal question might possibly be involved in a case, or if federal 
jurisdiction was necessary to protect a judicially determined federal 
interest not actually protected by an identifiable federal law. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought to shed light on the origins of Article III 
“arising under” jurisdiction. At the Federal Convention, delegates 
apparently extended federal judicial power to cases “arising under” 
the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States as a means—
more limited than other means, such as a congressional negative—of 
ensuring the supremacy of federal law. In ratification debates, those 
who attempted to give “arising under” jurisdiction any meaningful 
import described it to encompass cases involving the enforcement of a 
federal law or a dispute over the meaning of a federal law. They 
argued that “arising under” jurisdiction was necessary to ensure the 
proper enforcement and uniformity of federal laws. It fell upon 
federal courts to give practical operation to these principles. When 
federal courts confronted the task of determining their own Article 
III jurisdiction, they came to describe themselves as courts of 
“limited” jurisdiction in the English sense of that concept. As courts 
of limited jurisdiction, they would not exercise jurisdiction unless the 
party invoking federal jurisdiction demonstrated that federal law 
would be determinative of the right or title asserted in the federal 
proceeding that party commenced. For original “arising under” 
jurisdiction, a plaintiff had to demonstrate that federal law was 
determinative of a right or title asserted. When a federal court 
exercised original jurisdiction over a case, the Supreme Court 
apparently understood itself to function as a superior court of general 
appellate jurisdiction. For appellate “arising under” jurisdiction to 
review a state court judgment, however, a plaintiff in error had to 
demonstrate that federal law was determinative of a right or title 
asserted in the appellate proceeding. 
By observing these rules derived from English law, federal courts 
embraced a practice that at once enabled them to ensure the 
 
 326. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 394 (1821) (emphasis added). 
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supremacy of federal law but checked the extent to which they would 
encroach upon the jurisdiction of state courts. There is no question 
that the breadth of “arising under” jurisdiction, as explained by the 
Marshall Court, was coterminous with the breadth of congressional 
power to create and protect justiciable rights and titles. The Marshall 
Court did not, however, contrary to twentieth century accounts, 
assume for itself an “arising under” jurisdiction to protect federal 
interests unmoored from the governing requirements of an 
identifiable federal law. 
